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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Between the late 1980s and 2001, the Knoxville Community Development 
Corporation and the Knoxville Police Department implemented policies intended to 
reduce crime in Knoxville’s public housing.  Beginning with pilot programs in two 
housing sites in 1989, a cooperative relationship between KCDC and KPD emerged that 
evolved into the KCDC Security Patrol in 1990.   
 
By using Arcview software, I was able to separate the yearly violent crime 
incidents for 1992-2001 that occurred in two separate geographical regions: 1) the area 
represented by the KCDC housing sites where the policies were implemented, and 2) the 
remainder of the City of Knoxville.    
 
The descriptive statistics indicate that none of the six policies evaluated in this 
study have an effect upon total crime and an effect upon the occurrence level of 
aggravated assaults in the KCDC sites.  However, the 1999 team-based approach to 
policing and the new applicant screening process of 2000 seem to somewhat reduce 
crimes of opportunity and/or property crimes (i.e., burglary, larceny, auto theft, and 
robbery).  A 1996 One-Strike eviction policy has the same effect, but separating it from 
confounding events is not possible.  The demolition of College Homes in 1998 has a 
marginal effect upon aggravated assaults.   
  
Because I could not conduct a survey of Knoxville’s public housing residents, 
regression analyses in a cross-sectional design are used to gain further insight into other 
possible variables effecting Knoxville’s crime rate.  An individual census tract is the unit 
of analysis.  Socio-economic and demographic indicators of crime are used, as well as a 
policy dummy variable and a variable representing the degree of public housing within 
each tract.   A methodological problem during data collection within KPD prevents the 
use of data prior to 1996.  The regressions reveal that crime in Knoxville (1996-2001) is 
consistently associated with the proportion of males, and the proportion of those who are 
over the age of 25 who do not possess a high school education. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Purpose of this Study 
 
Crime in Knoxville’s public housing is an ongoing problem for the Knoxville 
Police Department (KPD) and the Knoxville Community Development Corporation 
(KCDC).  Between 1986 and 1993, the KPD sought to disrupt several gangs that were 
transporting cocaine and crack to Knoxville’s housing projects from Florida.  One 
particular gang was linked to dozens of drive-by shootings and 12 murders.  Despite the 
arrests of the leaders of the larger gangs by the late 1990s, smaller gangs, drug dealers, 
and prostitutes continued to operate in and around Knoxville’s public housing (KCDC 
2001).  Although public housing accounts for 1.5% of Knoxville’s total households, 15% 
of the total aggravated assaults and 4.4% of the total violent crimes occurred in KCDC 
developments in 1997.  When one compares the 1997 percentage of violent crimes per 
number of households in KCDC developments to the percentage of crimes per 
households citywide, public housing had a higher ratio in five of seven violent crime 
categories (including aggravated assault, auto theft, burglary, robbery, and rape). 
 
The physical nature of the sites and the types of residents who live there may be 
the direct causes of the crime problem.  The sites are typically 1-2 story brick structures, 
with a high population density.  The 2000 KCDC tenant characteristic report to HUD for 
all KCDC residents paints an interesting picture. 1  Of the residents, 65% have extremely 
low incomes, or below 30% of median.  More than half (59%) of the residents have 
incomes between $5001 and $10,000.  Over 90% receive some form of income assistance 
(including TANF, Social Security, or a pension).   There are plenty of easy crime targets 
in KCDC, as 51% of the residents are over age 62 or are disabled.  Although the KCDC 
population is racially diverse (48% Black and 52% White), 43% of household members 
are under the age of 18 (KCDC 2000b). 
 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether public policies/programs that 
attempted to reduce crime in Knoxville’s public housing developments were effective.   
The evolution of the policies and programs include:   
1) Physical safety improvements made to individual housing projects 
during the 1980s based on the theories of Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) 
2) The privatization of Knoxville streets in October 1992 (which allowed 
KCDC to issue “No Trespass” notices) 
3) The assignment of one Security Patrol officer to each KCDC study site 
in February 1993 
4) A “One Strike” eviction policy added to KCDC leases in September 
1996  
                                                 
1 including the KCDC residents who do not live in the study sites 
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5) The demolition of the College Homes housing project in December 
1998 with funding from HUD’s HOPE VI grant program 
6) A March 1999 team-based approach to policing that included several 
new policies  
7) A new residency applicant screening process in September 2000 
 
The histories of all the above policies will be described.  Crime data for the City 
of Knoxville were available for the years 1992-2001, which permits the use of descriptive 
statistics to evaluate possible effects of the last six policies.  Due to data restrictions, 
multivariate regression analysis is only possible for the last four policies/programs.   
 
The Need for Additional Research 
 
There is no single set of statistics that measures crime in individual or aggregate 
housing projects nationwide.  As a result, scholars tend to study individual housing 
projects or all the projects within a single PHA.  Despite this lack of comprehensive data, 
policymakers and law enforcement officials agree that crime is at its highest levels in 
public housing communities (Hellegers 1999).  Holzman (1996) is of the opinion that 
very few researchers have empirically examined crime in public housing.  Although some 
have made note of the fact that crime is prevalent around/in public housing, they have 
ignored the unique nature of public housing as an institution, and are unaware of its 
physical nature and administrative processes.  Government builds it, owns it, pays for its 
operations, and provides economic assistance that serves as the bulk of its residents’ 
incomes.  Unfortunately, criminal justice research is dampened because many police 
executives believe that PHAs belong to the federal government, and many PHAs do not 
cooperate with police.  For Holzman (1996), crime in public housing should be studied 
due to public housing’s history, its unique population, and the problems it creates for 
local law enforcement agencies.   
 
Public housing in the United States originated from the 1937 United States 
Housing Act, which was intended to assist state and local governments in the creation of 
housing for low-income families.  The federal government does not operate the 
organizations that are commonly referred to as public housing authorities (PHAs).  They 
are generally either service agencies operating within state, regional, county, and city 
governments, or they are independent corporations with limited ties to local government.  
PHAs develop organizationally in response to local needs, resulting in PHAs with 
different sizes and administrative arrangements.  The United States currently has over 
3200 PHAs, encompassing 1.3 million housing units and 3.3 million residents (Holzman 
1996).   According to Casey (1996), the median age of PHA renters in 1991 was 55 years, 
and 44% of PHA households included children.  Goering et al. (1994) found that 54% of 
public housing residents were African Americans and 13% were Hispanic, with an 
average household income was $7400. 
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KCDC and Study Sites 
 
KCDC is the independent corporation that manages Knoxville’s public housing, 
oversees admissions and occupancy, provides maintenance for the facilities, and seeks 
federal grants to fund facility upkeep, educational/training programs, and security 
personnel.  At the top of its organizational chart is a Board of Commissioners, to which 
the Executive Management must ultimately answer.  KCDC is divided into four 
departments, each having several divisions:   
 
1) Finance & Administration (Personnel, Accounting, Procurement, Management  
Information Systems) 
2) Social Services (Elderly/Disabled Services, Family Services, Self-Sufficiency  
Programs) 
3) Redevelopment (Section 8 Acquisitions/New Construction and Rehabilitation) 
4) Housing Management (Housing Management, Grants management, Admissions & Occupancy, 
Maintenance)    (KCDC 1998a)   
 
There are seven family-oriented KCDC sites that are the focus of this research, 
which fall under the supervision of the Housing Management Department.  They are: 
Western Heights, Montgomery Village, Austin Homes, Walter P. Taylor Homes, 
Christenberry Heights, Lonsdale Homes, and College Homes (KCDC 1998b).  See Figure 
1 below for their relative locations. 
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Figure 1.  KCDC Study Sites 
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The Game Plan 
 
This research proceeded in three stages.  The first stage was the collection of 
background factual information about the changes in the public policies/programs that 
have occurred in Knoxville since the late 1980s to control crime in the Knoxville’s public 
housing.  This information consisted of written grant applications, budget summaries, 
internal agency policies and procedures, and crime reports from KCDC and KPD.  
Information was also collected through informal meetings lasting 1-2 hours with key 
KPD and KCDC policy makers.   The initial information gathering stage of the research 
allowed specific policy changes to be identified that could be evaluated for effectiveness.   
 
The second stage in this research was the compilation of descriptive statistics 
based on crime incident data from 1992-2001 for the City of Knoxville.  The raw 
database was corrected and filtered using Arcview 3.2 mapping software and Geographic 
Information System (GIS) map data provided by KPD.  The KPD crime database 
averages approximately 11,700 crime incidents per year when the errors are removed (N 
= 116,795).    
 
The third stage of this research was a multivariate regression analysis of 
demographic and socio-economic census variables at the tract level, which included 
representative policy variables.   A cross-sectional design was used for each year between 
1996-2001.   
  
The Chapters 
 
The bulk of this introductory chapter will examine the historical events that 
occurred in Knoxville regarding the implementation of seven policies and programs 
intended to reduce crime in the seven KCDC housing projects.  Chapter Two is a 
literature review.  The actions of KCDC and KPD reflect federal housing policy (i.e. 
HOPE VI, applicant screening, use of a “one-strike” eviction policy), trends in policing 
(i.e. order maintenance and aggressive enforcement), and the theories of CPTED.  
 
Chapter Three will describe the data and methods to be utilized.  The crime data 
supplied by KPD and the methods used to analyze it statistically will be described, as 
well as any procedures used to remove errors that prevented mapping analysis.  The uses 
of the Arcview software as applied to the data will be detailed in layman’s terms.  By 
combining the KPD’s crime data and maps of Knoxville with Arcview mapping software, 
it is possible to visually (by creating maps which indicate where crimes have occurred) 
and statistically demonstrate how incidences of certain crimes have changed inside the 
housing projects and in the remainder of Knoxville before and after the implementation 
of public policies.  Census tract-level data will be used to determine whether the 
implemented public policies or other variables affected the crime rates for the census 
areas containing the targeted housing projects and tracts not containing public housing.  
Census data for individual tracts is crucial for this analysis, because citywide census data 
will not allow a valid evaluation of policies that effect targeted public housing.   
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 Chapter Four will contain analyses of descriptive statistics and regression 
findings.  Chapter Five will consist of  “lessons learned” and suggestions for future 
policy and research.   
 
Anticipated Findings 
 
 The privatization of streets in 1992 and the corresponding use of “No Trespass” 
notices should result in a decrease in crime.  This would be due to the removal of non-
residents who travel to the affected projects in search of drugs, prostitutes, or 
opportunities to commit other crimes.   
 
The assignment of officers to each KCDC site in 1993 and the team-based 
approach of 1999 should reduce crime in all of the KPD-patrolled projects for two 
reasons.  First, officers and residents would become more familiar with each other, 
thereby allowing officers to identify those who are not residents.  Second, the officers 
should develop a sense of ownership for their assigned project, and the residents might be 
more willing to cooperate with officers they regularly meet.    
 
The “one-strike” eviction policy of 1996 and the applicant screening policy of 
2000 should result in reduced crime, because they would allow the detection and removal 
of problem tenants.  The demolition of College Homes in 1998 should intuitively result in 
a dramatic decrease in crime in the geographic area occupied by the housing project 
itself.  However, I suspect that crime was only displaced to the surrounding 
neighborhoods, and was not eliminated.  Although there might be a brief period of crime 
reduction, I anticipate that I will find a quick return of crime to the area surrounding the 
demolition site. 
 
CPTED and The Beginning of the KCDC/KPD Relationship 
  
During the late 1980s, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
(CPTED) was the dominant paradigm in law enforcement in Knoxville’s public housing 
projects.  KCDC had been the recipient of multiple grants from the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to pay for its CPTED measures, in addition to 
providing funding for various social programs.  Although the names of these grants 
sometimes changed from one fiscal year to the next, these grants were all used by KCDC 
to supplement its operating budget.   Until the late 1980s, most of this external funding 
was spent on major building renovations, building maintenance, or physical security 
measures.  These grants included the Comprehensive Improvement Assistance Program 
(CIAP), the Comprehensive Grant Program, and the current Capital Fund Program (CFP) 
(White 2002).    
 
Drug activity in KCDC developments reached noticeable levels in 1987, with 
open drug sales from sidewalks.   By the summer of 1988, buildings slated for 
modernization by KCDC were repeatedly burglarized and vandalized.  Rumors began to 
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spread that a “Florida gang” was operating within the projects, and gang members let it 
be known that they did not want “their” buildings to be modernized.  Initially, KCDC 
drew on the experiences of other housing authorities and the advice and assistance from 
the KPD to stop the drug dealers (KCDC 1989).   
  
Participation in professional organizations and personal contacts suggested to 
KCDC management that several preparatory actions should be taken to ameliorate any 
crime developments in Knoxville’s public housing.  Staff members provided in-service 
training for KPD and Knox County Sheriff’s Department officers, and assisted KPD in 
encouraging residents to participate in Neighborhood Watch Programs.  KCDC’s 
Director of Housing served on KPD’s inter-agency Crime Assessment and Prevention 
Program.  Both the Director of Housing and the Executive Director received training in 
CPTED at the National Crime Prevention Institute at the University of Louisville.   All of 
the KCDC management and maintenance staff received training in crime awareness and 
prevention.  Internal KCDC procedures were reviewed, including the Admission 
Standards and lease enforcement.  There was a renewed focus upon drug prevention 
through educational and social programs that provided an alternative to the drug culture 
(e.g., the Knoxville’s Recreation Department programs, Just Say No Clubs) (KCDC 
1989). 
  
KCDC also pursued several strategies external to its organization during the late 
1980s to identify crime problems.  Each of the housing developments already had a 
Community Resident Organization.   KCDC created a Resident Council that held 
monthly meetings.  The Resident Council consisted of two members from each resident 
organization, the KCDC Executive Director, the Director of Housing, the individual 
development Housing Managers, and the KCDC Maintenance Administrator.  KCDC 
reviewed its developments for proper street address and housing unit numbering with the 
KPD, Knoxville Fire Department, the local 911 System, the Knoxville-Knox County 
Metropolitan Planning Commission, and the Postal Service.  It was hoped that better 
location identifiers would reduce confusion for emergency service provision and would 
foster better data collection (KCDC 1989). 
 
KCDC continued to follow CPTED strategies by working cooperatively with 
external agencies.  In 1987 (KCDC 1998d), the Mayor’s office, City Codes Enforcement, 
and other Knoxville City departments identified overgrown locations on KCDC property, 
as well as adjacent public and private property.  Private property owners were required to 
clear underbrush or pay the city to do the work.  City and KCDC staff cleared public 
property adjacent to the KCDC developments (KCDC 1989).   
 
In 1988 (KCDC 1998d), the City’s Traffic Engineering Department, after 
consultation with KPD and the Knoxville Fire Department, allowed the placement of 
barricades to either close streets or make them one-way, thereby preventing drug buyer 
traffic from flowing through the housing developments.  Dead ends or cul-de-sacs were 
created with the use of concrete curb stops, dumpsters, concrete traffic dividers, or 
landscaping (KCDC 1989).   
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KCDC started to add security lighting at multiple sites using a combination of 
CIAP, CGP, and KCDC operating funds in 1988 (KCDC 1998d).  KCDC staff inspected 
the lights weekly for outages, and the Knoxville Utilities Board agreed to make repairs in 
a timely fashion (KCDC 1989).   
 
Resident employees cleaned the common areas of KCDC developments, and 
dumpsters were emptied daily.  Residents could send applications to the Knoxville 
Nursery and Horticulture Department for the planting and maintenance of a tree in front 
of their housing unit, as part of the City’s Adopt-A-Tree Program in 1989 (KCDC 1989).   
  
Building on Oscar Newman’s (1972) concept of “defensible space,” KCDC 
wanted to separate the housing developments’ common areas and streets from the 
residents’ private space in 1989 using CIAP and operating funds (KCDC 1998d).  Instead 
of using chain link fencing that created a prison appearance and which was comparatively 
easy to damage, KCDC decided to install wrought iron fencing.   Although more 
expensive, wrought iron fencing is easy to maintain and harder to damage, because it is 
installed in prefabricated sections that are welded together, and the posts are secured with 
concrete.   Not only did this fencing prove impossible for the drug dealers to remove, but 
it was also more pleasing in appearance, primarily because this form of fencing is 
typically seen in middle and upper class neighborhoods (KCDC 1989).      
 
By Fall of 1989, the buildings were ultimately modernized and reoccupied, and 
directed patrols and enforcement efforts by the KPD were successful at forcing some of 
the street dealers to relocate.  KCDC then tried to take the initiative in reducing drugs in 
public housing by implementing a comprehensive pilot program in Walter P. Taylor 
Homes.  The effort was initially funded by the existing KCDC operating budget.  The 
Chairman of KCDC, William Baxter, held a press conference on September 25, 1989 to 
describe the program, titled: “A Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Enforcement 
Program for Walter P. Taylor Homes and (the adjoining) Dr. Lee Williams Senior Citizen 
Complex” (KCDC 1989).  
 
The program included the use of KPD officers to patrol the development 24 hours 
a day, in two-man walking patrols from 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight, 12:00 midnight to 
8:00 a.m., and 8:00 a.m. 4:00 p.m..  KCDC provided a housing unit in the middle of a 
drug-selling area to KPD for an office, and provided a rent-free unit to a KPD officer.  
The officers used cellular phones in addition to their police radios and used a KPD 
cruiser.  KPD used No Trespass letters to place non-residents on notice not to return 
(which will require more explanation later).  The Walter P. Taylor gymnasium became 
the site of a new Boys/Girls Club, which provided counseling and training opportunities 
for parents and teens.  Privacy fencing was installed to separate the elderly section of 
Taylor Homes from the family section.  Benches where drug dealers congregated were 
removed, overgrown landscaping was cut down, and lighting was added.  A 
Neighborhood Watch was established and KCDC created a GED and Self-Sufficiency 
Resident Training Program.   The program plans specifically stated that the final phase of 
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the program would be the expansion of its components to other developments and the 
securing of additional external funding (KCDC 1989).   
  
Also during 1989, KCDC received CIAP funding for major building renovations 
in Austin Homes.  By November 1989, vandalism of the improvements and thefts of the 
building materials forced Bill Crown, Director of Housing for KCDC, to contact KPD 
Captain Paul Fish for assistance.  Fish was in charge of KPD’s Crime Prevention Unit, 
and Crown knew Fish from their participation in KPD’s Crime Assessment and 
Prevention Program. Initially, KPD provided off-duty officers to secure Austin Homes 
when the construction crew was not on the premises, from Friday afternoon until Monday 
morning.  By the end of the second weekend, two thieves had been arrested (Green 
2001).   
 
Given the success in Austin Homes and the pilot program in Taylor Homes, 
KCDC began using its operating funds budget and modernization monies at the end of 
1989 to pay for the deployment of off-duty KPD officers in six KCDC developments.  
Initially, six officers were divided into three, two-man shifts, patrolling 24 hours per day 
for two months.  Officers photographed and videotaped vandalism and narcotics sales 
(Green 2001).  In 1990, the patrols officially became known as the KCDC Security 
Patrol.  At first, KPD provided the use of its vehicles and equipment as an in-kind 
contribution (KCDC 1998b).   
 
During the fall of 1989, HUD offered a new grant called the Public Housing Drug 
Elimination Program (PHDEP), which was intended to improve the quality of life of 
residents and to reduce drug activities in public housing.  Specifically, PHDEP offered 
grants to PHAs to develop tenant anti-crime controls, community drug prevention and 
treatment programs, tenant job training, additional law enforcement, enhanced security 
measures, and physical safety improvements (Hellegers 1999).  Despite some success in 
reducing drug activities in specific locations, KCDC and KPD believed that drug dealing 
and violent crime were still rampant in Knoxville’s public housing.  KCDC applied for 
the new grant by detailing the KPD/KCDC cooperative efforts between 1988-1989 and 
by utilizing a problem assessment that contained anecdotal and statistical information 
(KCDC 1989).  KCDC was compiling the PHDEP grant application at the same time the 
Taylor Homes pilot program was implemented. 
 
Despite all the previous crime control efforts, vehicles not clearly marked as 
belonging to KCDC or KPD were still approached by multiple street drug dealers during 
the fall of 1989.  Dealers even approached the Knoxville Police Chief, who drove an 
unmarked car.  Residents notified KCDC staff that female residents were being offered 
cash to allow dealers to use their apartments.  Dealers offered cash, tennis shoes, pizza 
and other inducements to resident youths to assist in drug deals and to serve as lookouts.  
Concrete street barricades and dumpsters were vandalized or moved, and dealers forced 
out of one development would later appear in another.  After the pilot program began in 
Taylor Homes, KPD received phone threats that an officer would be shot in retaliation for 
forcing the dealers to relocate (KCDC 1989). 
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KPD tracked calls for police service in 1989 on the streets within and surrounding 
the KCDC developments.  Based on the KPD analysis, the general population of 
Knoxville had 341 calls per 1000 persons, as compared to 478 for the housing 
developments.   Traffic counts conducted by the City of Knoxville found that between 
1600 to 1800 cars, an unusually high level, were driving down a street adjacent to Taylor 
Homes on a daily basis.  Over 1300 cars drove through one street daily in Austin Homes.  
The high traffic counts and calls for service left little doubt for KCDC that it still had 
crime problems (KCDC 1989). 
 
KCDC received its first PHDEP grant monies in 1990 (for fiscal year 1989), with 
$89,000 allocated to CPTED strategies (primarily fencing) and $161,000 for law 
enforcement (KCDC 2001).  KCDC already had support from KPD, so KCDC simply 
used the new PHDEP monies to pay for the use of KPD officers and equipment.  Captain 
Fish was assigned to coordinate the off-duty KPD officers who would work in the six 
sites.  At the outset of the KPD/KCDC arrangement, the KPD off-duty officers were paid 
as KCDC employees (Green 2001).    
 
The first KCDC/KPD contract was dated October 25, 1990.  KCDC considered 
other options to using KPD staff to patrol its facilities.  It could have contracted with a 
local security firm, formed its own security staff, or used a tenant patrol.  The 1989 
PHDEP grant application summarized their reasoning:  
 
We believe the problem required individuals well trained in law enforcement techniques;  
knowledgeable in applicable laws; armed but experienced in the when, where, and how  
of the use of arms, and especially experience in restraint of their use; “street-wise” about  
the problem that existed; and capable of making on-the-spot arrests.  Only KPD officers 
met this description.  (KCDC 1989) 
 
No Trespass List and Street Privatization 
 
Captain Fish met with a municipal court judge in 1989 to discuss methods of 
reducing crime related to the ongoing construction in Austin Homes.  KCDC’s No 
Trespass List policy evolved from these meetings.  First, the judge agreed to escalate the 
penalties for repeat trespassers in the construction area (Green 2002).  Second, signs were 
posted around Austin Homes, warning people not to trespass.  Beginning in 1991, No 
Trespass signs were installed in all of KCDC’s family developments.  Those ignoring the 
signs were initially given oral warnings, and non-residents were given written notices.  
KPD and KCDC agreed in 1991 that anyone arrested for narcotics offenses or repeat 
order maintenance crimes (i.e. public drunkenness, vandalism, prostitution, etc.) would 
be evicted by KCDC and would receive a written notice by mail not to return.  Those 
who received the notices were placed on a No Trespass List (Green 2001).   
  
Individuals on the list had some type of history that included drugs or other 
crimes that might affect the safety of KCDC residents.  To be placed on the list, an 
individual must first cause a disturbance or commit a crime on KCDC property.  A 
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Security Patrol officer or other KCDC staff member must then complete a “No Trespass 
Request” form and send it to the KCDC Coordinator’s office.  The KCDC Coordinator 
was the full-time KPD supervisor of the Security Patrol.  The KCDC Coordinator’s full-
time assistant would first conduct a background check on the individual, then review any 
supporting documentation or evidence, and finally would make a written 
recommendation to KCDC as to whether the individual should be placed on the list.  The 
Property Administrator at KCDC made the final decision to accept or deny the 
recommendation.  If put on the list, the Property Administrator would notify the person 
by registered mail, and the KCDC Coordinator’s office would add the person to the crime 
databases maintained by KPD (Hazelwood 1999a).     
  
If the Security Patrol found an individual on the list on KCDC property, the 
person would be served with a verbal trespass notice by the Security Patrol and be 
escorted off the property, if the individual had not yet been served in writing.  If the 
individual had been previously served, the officers would enforce the Knoxville’s 
criminal trespass statute by either arresting the person, giving the person a misdemeanor 
citation, or giving them a citation to municipal court.  Anyone wanting to be removed 
from the list had to appeal in writing to the main KCDC office.  Appeals were forwarded 
to the KCDC Coordinator’s assistant who would again conduct a background 
investigation.  Factors such as other crimes (or lack thereof) committed after being placed 
on the list, as well as the location, severity, and type of crime would be evaluated.  The 
KCDC Coordinator would make a recommendation to KCDC based on the investigation.  
The KCDC Vice President of Public Housing would make the final decision whether to 
approve the applicant’s removal request (Hazelwood 1999a). 
  
Since 1991, KCDC used PHDEP funding to give photo identification cards to all 
of its residents.  KPD used walking and bicycle patrols, as well as I.D. checkpoints at 
entrances, to identify anyone on the property (KCDC 1997a).    Much of what KPD 
officers do within the KCDC developments would not be legally possible unless the 
streets within the sites were private property or if KPD officers were not acting as private 
agents of KCDC.  Specifically, KPD officers would not have sufficient probable cause to 
stop a citizen and demand to see identification on a public street, nor would they be able 
to charge an otherwise law-abiding citizen with trespassing or approach an individual 
with a drug detection dog. 
  
College Homes was the first site that KCDC sought to make private property by 
leasing the streets within the housing development.  The Knoxville City Council 
approved the closing of the streets, sidewalks, and other areas in College Homes in July 
1990, and formally leased the closed areas to KCDC on August 8, 1990.  The City 
Council then closed streets and sidewalks in Western Heights, Montgomery Village, 
Walter P. Taylor Homes, Christenberry Heights, Lonsdale Homes, and Austin Homes in 
September 1992, and formally leased them to KCDC on October 14, 1992 (Defendant’s 
Memorandum, Thompson v. Ashe 1997). 
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Court Challenges 
 
The ability of the Security Patrol to search individuals trespassing on KCDC 
property and the legality of the No Trespass List were challenged in court.  The first case 
was United States v. Lumari Harshaw, argued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Tennessee at Knoxville during May 1995.  On October 13, 1994, two Security 
Patrol officers were conducting an ID checkpoint in Austin Homes on Hanson Avenue.  
Harshaw parked his car in a space just before reaching the checkpoint.  When he did not 
offer proper ID, the officers discovered through NCIC that he had a suspended drivers 
license.  As one officer wrote a citation for the offense, she allowed Harshaw to exit the 
vehicle.  The officer observed that Harshaw put one hand in his pocket while he talked to 
two relatives at the rear of the car.  Seeing a bulge in his pocket and thinking he had a 
gun or drugs, the officer grabbed his hand.  At that point, Harshaw threw something over 
an embankment and ran.  Harshaw resisted arrest until backup officers arrived to help 
handcuff him. When arrested, he was in still in possession of 17.7 grams of crack cocaine 
and 9.7 grams of marijuana, and the packet he threw contained 37.8 grams of powdered 
cocaine (Memorandum Opinion, U.S. v. Lumari Harshaw 1995).   
 
Harshaw was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine, and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine 
base.  The defendant moved to suppress all the evidence gained as a result of the search 
of his person on Fourth Amendment grounds.  The District Court denied Harshaw’s 
motion, concluding that the roadblock-type ID checkpoint and subsequent search of the 
defendant were acceptable for multiple reasons.  First, the officers were not using 
unrestrained discretion, because they were inspecting every vehicle in a systematic 
manner, and had the right to investigate evidence of other crimes.  Second, once the 
officer discovered that Harshaw did not have a driver’s license, the officer had probable 
cause to arrest the defendant and to conduct a limited pat-down for the officer’s safety.  
Third, the officers were on the premises due to KCDC’s legitimate concern about 
unauthorized individuals having access to the property.  Fourth, the officer had 
reasonable grounds to stop the defendant initially because he seemed to be trying to avoid 
the checkpoint, in addition to the suspicion created by the defendant’s attempt to flee 
(Memorandum Opinion, U.S. v. Lumari Harshaw 1995).     
 
The No Trespass List was challenged directly by Albert Thompson, a non-
resident of KCDC, when he filed a class action suit in 1997 in the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.  The District Court dismissed his suit, so 
Thompson appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  Thompson was 
suing KCDC; the KCDC Executive Director, Fred DeBruhl; the City of Knoxville; the 
Knoxville Mayor, Victor Ashe; and Phil Keith, the Chief of KPD (U.S. v. Thompson, 
16 Fed. Appx. (6th Cir. Tenn. 2001)). 
 
Thompson had been arrested 23 times on KCDC property, and had been on the 
No Trespass List for several years.  Even during the court proceedings, Thompson was 
arrested again on KCDC property for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.  
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At the time of the arrest for criminal trespass that prompted his suit, Thompson was in the 
apartment of a KCDC tenant.  The tenant, an acquaintance of Thompson, gave him 
permission to enter so he could use the telephone to find his brother.  The police 
discovered Thompson on the premises when they arrived at the apartment looking for 
another man (U.S. v. Thompson, 16 Fed. Appx. 340 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2001)). 
   
Thompson claimed the defendants’ use of the No Trespass policy had  
 
“violated the plaintiff’s rights to privacy and freedom of association protected by the First  
and Fourteenth Amendments; violated the plaintiff’s rights to be free from unreasonable  
searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment; and violated the plaintiff’s  
rights to equal protection and due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The  
complaint further claimed that these actions…violated the Tennessee Constitution, and  
that the defendants had maliciously harassed the plaintiffs in violation of Tennessee law.” 
 (U.S. v. Thompson, 16 Fed. Appx. 340 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2001)) 
 
The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.   The Court 
found that Thompson’s arrest for criminal trespass was a result of probable cause, did not 
violate Tennessee’s Criminal Trespass statute, and did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Court also found that Thompson’s right to visit other individuals on 
KCDC property was not fundamental, because KCDC had a “legitimate government 
interest” in protecting its residents.  The No Trespass policy did not discriminate against 
any specific group of individuals; therefore, it did not violate the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In addition, as Thompson had no protected right to visit 
family or friends on KCDC property, he did not have to be granted procedural due 
process (U.S. v. Thompson, 16 Fed. Appx. 340 (6th Cir. Tenn. 2001)). 
 
The Beginning of the Current Contract – One Officer Per Site 
  
In 1992, an officer was injured in a traffic accident while working for KCDC 
(Green 2002).  Due to concerns from its insurance carrier, KCDC was forced to contract 
with KPD for the provision of officers and to cover them under the Knoxville’s liability 
insurance.   Since KPD officers were working over 40 hours per week, the new contract 
would pay them at time and a half.  The City of Knoxville would also be paid an 
additional 10% to cover administrative, vehicle, and worker’s compensation costs.  The 
1992 contract included the above changes and marked the beginning of the current 
KPD/KCDC contractual relationship.   
 
Lt. Ken Bowman was the KCDC Coordinator from 1993–1996.  In February 
1993, in response to drug activities that were occurring at all times of the day, KCDC 
used PHDEP funds to deploy one Security Patrol officer for the first time in each of the 
seven family developments during KCDC business hours.  Captain Don Green (then a 
Sergeant) was the Coordinator from 1996-1999 (KCDC 1998b).  Both Bowman and 
Green were involved in enforcement efforts by external law enforcement agencies that 
targeted organized out-of-state gangs during the mid-1990s (Green 2002).  The impact of 
these enforcement efforts will be addressed further in Chapter 3. 
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One-Strike Eviction Policy 
 
KCDC leases, like other residential lease agreements, contain expectations for 
resident and guest behavior.  Residents can be evicted for any behavior that threatens the 
life, health, safety, property, or peaceful enjoyment of the property of the other residents.  
However, KCDC lease agreements have several additional penalties.  Not only can 
residents be penalized or evicted for crimes they commit, but also for crimes committed 
by their guests.  Based on the “One-Strike” public housing eviction policy advocated by 
the Clinton Administration in 1996, and due in part to the purpose of the PHDEP grant, 
residents can be evicted for any drug related offense, or involvement in drug activity of 
any kind, inside or outside KCDC property.  The One-Strike policy was officially 
incorporated into KCDC’s lease agreements on September 1, 1996 (KCDC 1998b).  A 
resident does not have to be convicted of a drug related crime; he/she only has to be 
charged with one.   Any criminal activity by a resident or a guest is documented with a 
security report and is forwarded to the relevant KCDC development manager, who makes 
the eviction decisions (Hazelwood 1999b). 
 
College Homes and HOPE VI 
 
 KCDC applied to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
HOPE VI grant program in 1997 with the goal of demolishing College Homes and 
building mixed-income housing in the historic Mechanicsville area.  Mechanicville was 
established in 1870 to the west of Knoxville’s downtown, and is one of the city’s oldest 
neighborhoods.  One revitalization plan stated the following goals for the revitalization 
project: 1) eliminate slum conditions, 2) redesign poorly planned and outmoded physical 
patterns, 3) free choice land for new development, 4) eliminate blight conditions, 5) 
upgrade the surrounding neighborhood, 6) offer economic development and commercial 
opportunities, and 7) produce a sustainable residential neighborhood (KCDC 1997b, p. B-
14).   
 
Built during the Roosevelt era, College Homes occupied 15 acres of 
Mechanicsville.  With 24.6 units per acre, in a square, two-story, brick, “bunker style” 
design, College Homes was becoming extremely expensive to maintain and manage by 
the late 1990s.  Property management received 50 percent more work orders than any 
other KCDC site.  The baseboard heating system was expensive to maintain, and College 
Homes had the highest utility costs of all KCDC’s family developments.  It would take 
all of KCDC’s capital improvement grant funding for five years to modernize College 
Homes, at an estimated cost of $24.2 million (KCDC 1998c).   
 
When originally constructed, anyone capable of purchasing a car would have too 
much income to qualify for residency.  Consequently, the development had few parking 
spaces and the Knoxville Fire Department could not gain access to most of the buildings 
via the narrow access alleys.   The design of the development and the topography 
prevented the widening of the adjacent streets and the adaptation of sidewalks and 
entrances to meet Americans with Disabilities Act standards.  The style of windows 
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prohibited air circulation, yet the buildings also lacked insulation.  Despite weatherization 
in the mid-1980s, the interior walls often sweated and the original terra cotta tile roofs 
leaked during bad weather, causing mold to form on interior walls and ceilings.  To 
prevent crime, concrete barricades and wrought iron fencing were installed, yet the site’s 
design prevented the creation of “defensible space” and the installation of surveillance 
cameras.  The barriers only served to isolate the development from the surrounding 
neighborhood.  Several of the buildings did not receive more than three hours of sunlight 
per day (KCDC 1998c).   
 
Not surprisingly, the development was an easy target for predatory criminals, and 
KCDC found it impossible to get families to live in College Homes.  According to one 
KCDC analysis, College Homes residents were eight times more likely to be assaulted 
than residents elsewhere in the city, and the development had 20 times as many drive-by 
shootings than the Knoxville average  (KCDC 1997b).   
 
The total cost of the development project was $42.8 million.  The sources 
included $22.1 coming from HOPE VI, $8.2 million from home buyers, $4.7 million in 
equity from low income housing tax credits; $750,000 from private foundations; $3 
million from the CGP; $1.2 million from CDBG and utility board funds; $820,000 from 
KCDC; and $2 million from other local public funding (KCDC 1998c, p. 32).   In order 
to separate the HOPE VI project from the rest of its activities, to separate the project from 
the stigma of “public housing,” and to make it easier to receive charitable contributions 
for the project, KCDC created a separate 501(C)(1) not-for-profit corporation called 
Passport Development Corporation (PDC).   PDC would operate as a subsidiary of 
KCDC, using KCDC’s expertise and resources, yet existing as a separate corporation.  
KCDC used Cornerstone Knoxville LLC as the Master Developer for the College 
Homes/Mechanicsville Revitalization Program. 
 
After environmental review, the demolition application for the existing buildings 
was approved on July 1, 1998.  Demolition began in December 1998, and was completed 
before the end of winter.  Once the buildings were demolished on the College Homes 
site, they would be replaced with two-family rental duplexes and mixed-income single-
family homes.  The replacement dwellings would be in the form of individual, residential 
houses, in several different architectural styles to mimic a traditional neighborhood.  The 
homes would have washer/dryer connections, abundant closet space, and first floor 
bathrooms.  All the homes would have front porches, windows, and residential style 
doors that faced the streets, thereby permitting the residents to keep watch over the 
community (KCDC 1998c).     
 
Before the buildings could be demolished, KCDC had to develop a strategy for 
relocating the residents.  The residents were typically very poor, with 31 percent of the 
households having zero income in 1997.   The average annual household income was 
$2220.  Residents would be given a choice of relocating to another KCDC development 
or a Section 8 property that accepted Certificates/Vouchers to offset any increase in rent.   
KCDC provided lists of available properties to the current residents, and even transported 
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them to prospective Section 8 properties.  Part of the HOPE VI grant funding would be 
spent on self-sufficiency case managers and job placement specialists in a new KCDC 
program called Passport Housing.  The program was intended to “promote income 
diversity by requiring all adult family members to be employed or in job training and 
fulfilling a contract with specific goals and time lines to become self-sufficient”   (KCDC 
1998c, p. 18).   
 
KCDC acquired several tracts of land outside the area occupied by College 
Homes.  In addition to 150 vacant lots, three churches and four small businesses were 
acquired and relocated in order to change street patterns into traditional grid blocks that 
included green space, sidewalks, and pedestrian street lighting.   As a governmental 
agency, KCDC could use imminent domain to obtain property for redevelopment.  Unlike 
most states where the condemning authority must go to trial to obtain title to the property, 
Tennessee law allowed KCDC to file a “Declaration of Taking,” in effect giving KCDC 
title to the property on the day the property was condemned, regardless of any other 
claims on the title.   In conjunction with HOPE VI funding, private foundation funding 
was used to cover most of the costs associated with moving the church.    Public funds 
were used only when it could be justified in terms of economic development or self-
sufficiency.  The design team was led by Urban Design Associates, which hosted several 
public meetings during April-May 1997 where the concerns of College Homes and 
Mechanicsville residents, community leaders, KCDC management, local agencies, and 
local government leaders were addressed (KCDC 1998c). 
 
When the four-year project is completed, the College Homes property will be 
combined with the other adjacent property to accommodate 132 new houses, with an 
additional 123 houses to be built in the surrounding Mechanicsville neighborhood.  Of 
the new homes, there will be 138 houses for sale and 117 rental units.  Half of the rental 
units will be designated for Passport Housing; the other half will be Standard Affordable 
Housing for households earning 30% to 50% of the median income.   The for-sale homes 
would be priced at “Market” and “Below-Market” prices, ranging from $55,000 to 
$85,000 depending on the type of house.  Most of the new homes would be reserved for 
buyers earning up to 115% of median income; half would go to those earning less than 
60% of median (the buyers would be eligible for special financing); 10 percent would be 
sold without income restrictions.  First priority for the rental units would be given to 
former College Homes residents (KCDC 1998c).    
 
The Team-Based Approach 
 
In March 1999, Sergeant Jeff Hazelwood became the KCDC Coordinator.2   
Hazelwood implemented a team-based approach, permanently assigning one KPD 
sergeant (or other supervisory rank) as Security Patrol supervisor for each of the six 
KCDC housing developments.3  The supervisor for each site was allowed to select and 
                                                 
2 Hazelwood left KPD in 2002 to manage the security force in Chattanooga’s public housing. 
3 College Homes was demolished prior to Hazelwood’s appointment. 
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train the other officers who would be permanently assigned to their development.  
Hazelwood said the selected team members were typically “go-getters and outgoing 
officers” who worked in patrol beats around the KCDC sites, and who were thereby 
familiar with the surrounding neighborhoods.  Security Patrol site supervisors earned 
extra overtime pay for their administrative duties.  The result was a team of officers at 
each KCDC site who worked well together, and who always worked at the same location.  
Hazelwood believed that this new arrangement would permit Security Patrol officers and 
KCDC residents to become familiar with each other (Hazelwood 2002).    
 
Security Patrol officers work during their off-duty hours, from 6 p.m. – 11 p.m. 
during the week and Sunday, and from 6 p.m. – midnight on Fridays and Saturdays.  
PHDEP grants received by KCDC from HUD are used to fund the entire salaries and 
personnel benefits for the KCDC Coordinator and his assistant, in addition to funding the 
overtime pay for the other Security Patrol officers and the use of KPD equipment.  Two 
more KPD officers were funded by PHDEP to patrol the six KCDC sites by day (one 
officer for three sites) (Hazelwood 2002).    
 
While working in the KCDC sites, KPD staff serve as agents of KCDC in a 
security role.  They are not supposed to respond to calls for police service outside of the 
developments, nor are they supposed to provide police services within the sites, i.e. 
making arrests (Hazelwood 2002).  Calls for police services within KCDC developments 
are to be handled by regular KPD patrol officers, unless none is available or an 
immediate response is necessary (e.g., a patrol officer calls for assistance) (Hazelwood 
1999b).  
 
Based on his previous military training, Hazelwood wanted to create standard 
operating procedures to formalize the new team-based approach.  He had three primary 
goals: 1) the identification and removal of non-residents, 2) documentation of crimes 
involving residents or their guests, and 3) order maintenance (Hazelwood 1999b).  Within 
his written SOPs and during our interview, he clearly stated: “public housing does not 
mean open to the public” (Hazelwood 1999b; Hazelwood 2002).   According to 
Hazelwood (2002), the primary task of the KPD is to get criminals out of the KCDC 
properties.   
  
The notion of order maintenance was included in Hazelwood’s SOPs to address 
physical property conditions and public order crimes that create an overall environment 
conducive to drug related and serious crimes.  Officers are supposed to notify KCDC 
management of litter, broken windows and doors, abandoned vehicles, graffiti, etc.  Of 
particular concern are visible street crimes, such as public drunkenness, vandalism, 
prostitution, and even loitering (Hazelwood 1999b).    
 
Security Patrol officers are encouraged to make regular “contacts” within the 
KCDC developments, and this serves as the basis for their performance evaluations.  A 
contact is defined as an arrest, citation, or security report.  Site supervisors are 
responsible for submitting monthly reports showing the total numbers of contacts for 
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their site.  When a potential problem resident is identified, injured or off-duty KPD 
investigators watch the resident for illegal activities or conduct a “knock and talk.”  A 
knock and talk is exactly what it sounds like—knock on the person’s door and ask them 
questions, or ask them for permission to search the premises, based on a resident 
complaint or observed suspicious behavior.  Officers are not concerned with gathering 
evidence so individuals can be convicted of a crime per se.  Rather, officers only want to 
find enough evidence of a crime that would allow problem residents to be evicted under 
the One-Strike policy or that would permit individuals to be placed on the No Trespass 
List.  Consequently, many of the individuals appearing on the No Trespass list and those 
who are evicted are caught with some small form of drug paraphernalia (Hazelwood 
2002).   
 
Nevertheless, officers are discouraged from using citations for “nit-picky” 
offenses (e.g. a broken car taillight) when residents are involved, particularly if the minor 
offense is unrelated to public housing crime.   In Hazelwood’s opinion, without officer 
discretion for the enforcement of minor offenses, it would be impossible to foster good 
resident-KPD relations (Hazelwood 2002).   
  
Hazelwood created the S.P.I.E. form (Screening, Prevention, Interdiction, and 
Enforcement – see Appendix A.) to be used by the officers at each development to form 
quarterly and monthly tactical plans to deal with specific crime problems as they arise.  
The simple form is a method of gaining input from the KPD/KCDC officers, and it 
documents concerns raised by residents at the monthly meetings of the Resident Councils 
(Hazelwood 2002).    
 
New Applicant Screening 
 
 All applicants for KCDC housing must complete several authorizations for the 
release of information.  One is form HUD-9886, which allows HUD and KCDC to 
confirm applicant incomes.  Next is a KCDC form asking identification questions (e.g., 
name, social security number, birth date) about all household members and for any 
information regarding past residency in a KCDC development.  The most important form 
for background checks is a blanket form titled “Authorization To Release Records and 
Information.”  This last form states that KCDC employees and agents of KCDC may 
review records pertaining to the following:   
 
• employment and unemployment histories 
• Social Security Administration  
• Department of Human Services 
• Utility companies 
• Police and Sheriff’s Department databases 
• Veteran’s Administration 
• Juvenile and Circuit Court 
• Homeless shelters 
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• Parole officers 
• Drug treatment centers 
• Records from any landlord 
• Any other records regarding the applicant or any minor child under the 
applicant’s care that would permit KCDC to determine whether the person is 
eligible for benefits or can be denied benefits 
 
All of the forms are included in Appendix A. 
 
Until 2000, KCDC had an internal policy that required a background check 
through NCIC only for new residency applicants if the applicant had not lived in 
Knoxville for three years.  This was a simple “yes/no” screening process that did not 
include a check for local crimes.  After several months of persuasion by KPD, KCDC 
relinquished the task of screening applicants to KPD in September 2000.  All KCDC 
applicants are now subjected to a detailed criminal record check within 48 hours of 
submitting an application.  Several criminal databases are now reviewed, including 
NCIC, a sex offender registry, the Knox County computer database of records and reports 
(primarily for juvenile offenders), a check for local offenses in Knoxville and Knox 
County, and a comparison to the KCDC NoTrespass list.   All public housing residents 
over the age of 16 are screened, but only those over the age of eighteen are screened 
through the sex offender registry.  Once applicants are screened through the databases, 
the KCDC Coordinator his assistant would make a recommendation to KCDC to deny or 
admit the applicant.  KCDC makes the final acceptance/denial decision (Hazelwood 
2002). 
  
Hazelwood developed a list of denial criteria, based primarily on President 
Clinton’s 1996 One-Strike policy.  Membership on the No Trespass List, as well as 
criminal records containing sex offenses, murder, and attempted homicide result in an 
automatic denial recommendation.  Any drug possession or paraphernalia charge, 
aggravated assault, or two or more simple assaults within three years of the application 
date; or charges for the manufacture, sale or delivery of controlled substances within ten 
years are also grounds for denial.  Other violent felonies and multiple public order crimes 
(e.g. disorderly conduct or prostitution) committed within three years of the application 
date are reviewed on a case-by-case basis (Hazelwood 2000).   
 
When making denial recommendations, Hazelwood and his assistant were not 
swayed by the fact that an applicant may not have been convicted of a particular crime, 
typically choosing to err on the side of caution.  For example, an applicant might simply 
appear in a police report on the local database for misdemeanor drug possession, but the 
criminal case could in fact have been dismissed later.  When in doubt about an applicant, 
Hazelwood used a simple rule of thumb that he asked me to quote: “Is this the type of 
person I want to live next to my grandmother?” (Hazelwood 2002).    
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CHAPTER II 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW 
 
A Brief History of U.S. Public Housing 
 
The Depression-era Wagner-Steagall Act of 1937 provided loans to local and 
state governments for the construction of safe, decent public housing for low-income 
families.  The federal government did not own the new local public housing authorities 
(PHAs).  The PHAs were supposed to exist with varying degrees of independence under 
the supervision of state, county, regional, or city governments.  An executive director, 
who reports to a board of directors, manages a typical PHA.  A mayor or county 
administrator usually appoints the board.  Some PHAs are a branch of a government 
entity, while others exist as independent corporations.  Because PHAs tend to have some 
degree of independence, there are a wide range of PHA administrative arrangements 
nationwide.  During the 1930s and 1940s, public housing was seen as an inexpensive, 
acceptable place to live, particularly for veterans returning from World War II who 
wanted to start new families (Holzman 1996).   
 
Originally, rent payments were supposed to cover PHA operation costs, but 
federal subsidies were required to make the rent affordable.  Instead of funding the 
housing authorities yearly by grant appropriations, the proponents of public housing 
persuaded the federal government to lock itself into long-term agreements in the form of 
contracts with PHAs.  The federal government was typically committed to give PHAs 
funding for 60 years, or the same period of amortization as federal loans (Von Hoffman 
1998).   
 
Interest groups supporting the housing industry wanted public housing units to be 
cheap structures that would not compete with homes produced by private companies.  
Conservatives in Congress wanted to limit construction costs and the income eligibility 
levels of tenants.  Proponents of public housing wanted sturdier structures that would not 
deteriorate into slums, and which would last for the amortization period.  These 
contradictory preferences resulted in public housing that was built from cheap, durable 
materials, such as reinforced concrete and cinder block, with very few comforts.  The 
early U.S. Housing Authority created guidelines determining the minimum space 
required for plumbing and furniture space, which local authorities adopted (Von Hoffman 
1998).   
 
Early projects, as in Boston, were 3-story apartments, but during the 1950s and 
1960s large cities like Chicago and Philadelphia built high-rise versions in inner cities.  
The inner city locations were selected to defray complaints about integrating white 
neighborhoods and allowed local officials to claim credit for clearing slums.  These 
locations were expensive, which forced the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to 
impose new cost ceilings.  This made it harder to produce quality housing, which forced 
builders to cut corners.  Room sizes dropped, population density levels were raised, 
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amenities such as landscaping were eliminated, and steam pipes were not insulated (Von 
Hoffman 1998).   
 
Housing policies of the 1950s forced local administrators to rent to people 
dislocated by highway construction and urban renewal, which were usually unstable 
families.  Crime in public housing began to grow, and public housing earned a reputation 
as the last resort for the poor.  Since the 1970s, inner cities emptied as more affluent 
people moved to the suburbs, taking job opportunities with them.  The project buildings 
were so big and sturdy, that they are now expensive to remove (Von Hoffman 1998).   
 
The Nature of Public Housing Research 
 
During the Reagan administration, research and data collection about public 
housing by the federal government was sharply curtailed, forcing researchers to rely on 
studies and data created before 1981.  Research findings for the late 1970s and early 
1980s were therefore confined to the larger PHAs in large central cities, because these 
PHAs contained sufficient sample sizes for independent quantitative research.  Studies of 
crime policies in an individual PHA or single large housing project in a single city remain 
very common in the literature, due to the nonexistence of a national database of crime in 
public housing (Popkin et al. 1995).  Several examples are: 
 
Elliot (1996) ….North Little Rock,  Arkansas 
Dilworth (1997)…………………. .Baltimore 
July (1998)…………………….….Milwaukee 
Popkin et al. (1999)………………….Chicago 
McNulty et al. (2000)………………...Atlanta 
Varady and Carrozza (2000)………Cincinnati 
 
The 1990s saw conflicting finding about crime levels and the presence of public 
housing.  Some concluded that PHAs were to blame, while others could not separate the 
influence of PHAs on the crime rate from the influence of surrounding neighborhoods or 
other factors (Holzman 1996).   In an effort to create a methodology for the study of 
crime in public housing, HUD adapted the Bureau of Justice Statistic’s National Crime 
Victimization Survey in 1995.  The new survey was supposed to be used by individual 
PHAs to assess crime prevention programs.  Residents in targeted developments were to 
be surveyed by telephone in a pretest-posttest manner.  However, many PHA residents 
did not have telephones, so HUD was forced to search for other methods for PHAs to 
administer the surveys cheaply (Holzman 1996).  The primary problem for any researcher 
remains the lack of data specific to public housing projects. 
 
Situational Crime Prevention 
 
Multiple strategies for crime reduction in public housing appear in the literature.  
One method is the use of  “situational crime prevention,” or the elimination of 
environmental conditions that make it easier to commit crime in particular circumstances.  
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These measures include restrictions upon entry/exit, resident Ids, surveillance, and rule 
setting (Popkin et al. 1995).   
 
Jane Jacobs’ classic work, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961), 
argues that any property devoted to a single land use will be deserted for long periods of 
the day, due to scheduling of use.  By creating multifunctional areas that receive 
continuous use, she believes informal surveillance will occur, thereby reducing criminal 
activities.  She assumes that individuals using the multifunctional areas will intercede 
during a crime.  Certain neighborhood designs, such as streets with wide sidewalks, are 
preferable because they encourage children to play under the watchful eyes of their 
parents (Jacobs 1961).    
 
Building upon the work of Jacobs (1961) and theoretical literature regarding the 
concept of territoriality, Oscar Newman (1972) created a concept called “defensible 
space” to address what he saw as the breakdown of social mechanisms.  Newman looked 
at the conditions in large public housing projects in New York City and concludes that 
residents should be encouraged to monitor the public areas (or small yards or entryways) 
shared by the residents.  Residents who are unable to protect themselves in this manner 
will have no motivation to keep these areas free of crime, because they cannot develop a 
sense of community or responsibility “for ensuring a safe, productive, and well-
maintained living space” (Newman 1972, p. 3).   
 
An entire literature devoted to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
(CPTED) arose in the early 1970s and continues to influence housing and policing policy 
today (e.g., Jeffery 1971; Merry 1981; Taylor and Harrell 1996; Crowe 2000).   Most of 
the early CPTED studies from the 1970s and 1980s built upon Newman’s (1972) concept 
of defensible space by applying it to residential neighborhood design and commercial 
property protection.  The first demonstration projects occurred in Hartford, Connecticut; 
Portland, Oregon; a school in Broward County, Florida; and smaller sites sponsored by 
the Westinghouse National Issues Center.  The researchers conducting these projects 
typically recommended changes to the physical environment (i.e., changing street designs 
and traffic flow), the creation of community organizations, and better community-police 
relations (Greenberg and Rohe 1984).   
 
 The CPTED literature does not produce clear recommendations for public 
housing.   Skogan and Annan (1994) find that the design of most high-rise apartments 
lack lobbies or entryways that prevent strangers from entering.  Taylor and Harrell (1996) 
write that it is unclear whether redesigning development layouts and controlling physical 
decay are effective in reducing crime.  Holzman, Kudrick, and Voytek (1996) find that 
the size of the development is related to crime more than the style of development.   
Merry (1981) argues that design alone cannot overcome residents’ sense of anonymity, 
distrust, and fear.  Keyes (1992) believes that CPTED focuses on prevention of crimes 
committed by intruders, but the residents commit most of the crimes in public housing.   
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Newman (1972) argues that high-rise apartments have higher crime rates than 
low-rise structures, even when controlling for demographic characteristics.  Waller and 
Okihiro’s (1978) study of private apartments counters Newman’s work, finding that a 
majority of burglary victims live on the bottom floors of low-rise buildings, which 
suggests the significance of ease of access.  Mawby (1977) writes that the number of 
offenders in a building is a greater influence upon the crime rate than the building height.  
According to Wilson (1980), vandalism is related to the number of children in the 
building, and is not correlated to building size or defensible space measures. 
 
In 1999, Popkin et al. conducted a multi-year study of resident satisfaction, 
victimization, and housing authority policies in the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA).   
They discovered that many of the security measures did nothing to prevent gang/drug 
activities by the residents themselves.  The police could not eliminate the gangs for 
several reasons.  First, the buildings were large, which provided many places for the well- 
organized gangs to operate.  Second, the gangs were well funded by drug sales, while the 
CHA needed more public funds to merely maintain the buildings.  Third, the gangs had 
many willing recruits.  The researchers ultimately conclude that demolition of the 
developments may be the only solution for CHA, but this will cause more problems in the 
short run as gang territories are displaced, and as residents must find other housing 
(Popkin et al. 1999). 
 
Popkin et al. (1999) identify some alternate explanations of crime and disorder in 
public housing: 
1) Public housing is physically and socially isolated from other neighborhoods.  Constructed with 
bad designs on “superblocks”, it is separated from surrounding neighborhoods by roads or 
railways in areas that ensure few employment opportunities, because the areas have little 
commercial or industrial development 
2) Policies ensure racial segregation, and the artificial nature of the communities guarantee few social 
norms, which are ultimately provided by gangs. 
3) Federal housing was originally intended as temporary housing for the working poor, but federal 
policies such as income ceilings and preferences for the very poor pushed out working families. 
4) Inadequate funds for maintenance and poor management lead to accelerated building neglect. 
 
Regardless of the criticisms and alternate theories of crime, the proponents of 
CPTED are consistent in making a linkage between crime and the high-rise architectural 
style; consequently, large public housing structures are consistently (and arguably 
correctly) portrayed as densely populated, crime-infested environments.  After three 
decades of CPTED studies, large public housing developments nationwide are presently 
being replaced by smaller, suburban developments, or large buildings are being 
refurbished (Holzman 1996).    
 
Aggressive Law Enforcement and Community Policing 
 
Aggressive law enforcement appears as a second crime control method in the 
literature.  During the 1980s, politicians, the media, and the general public characterized 
drugs as a threat to the underpinnings of U.S. society.  Consequently, all levels of 
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government increased their efforts to control both illegal drug buyers and sellers.  In 
1986, Congress created the Anti-drug Abuse Act to foster enforcement programs, put 
more officers in the field, and to create mandatory sentences for traffickers.  President 
Bush created the Office of National Drug Control Policy in 1989, which emphasized the 
use of harsher sentences and included billions of new enforcement dollars.  Crime control 
tactics in the 1980s featured direct police actions such as surveillance of dealer locations, 
undercover operations, intensifying police patrols, use of anonymous tip hotlines as 
grounds for “reasonable suspicion,” aggressive seizures of property (under the 1984 
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act), and the use of arrests for minor non-drug offenses (e.g. 
misdemeanor disorderly conduct, loitering, and traffic enforcement).  Tactics in public 
housing included all of the above measures plus the screening of potential public housing 
residents.  Street barricades and guard checkpoints on public streets were used to check 
vehicles and occupants for suspicious activities, first in Miami neighborhoods in 1988 
and then in Los Angeles in 1990 (Grinc 1998).   
 
Throughout the 1980s, residents of high-rise public housing in large U.S. cities 
expressed fears of gang violence and drug activities.  In response, HUD changed its 
policy that required pre-eviction hearings in order to make it easier to evict suspected 
dealers.  PHAs responded with aggressive crime sweeps, such as Operation Clean Sweep 
in the Chicago Housing Authority in 1988.  The Chicago sweep included the sealing of a 
building for up to forty-eight hours, door-to-door inspections, requiring occupants to 
produce proof of residency, and the eviction of anyone in possession of illegal drugs 
(Grinc 1998). 
 
The use of non-drug offenses was intended to reduce illegal drug activities by 
making it difficult for individuals to buy or sell drugs in a particular area, thereby 
“hassling” the street-level drug trade out of business.  Police actions tended to result in 
lawsuits when individual departments increased arrests for non-drug offenses and the 
crackdowns were perceived as harassment of innocent citizens (Grinc 1998).   
 
Researchers interested in aggressive law enforcement found that three strategies 
did not reduce serious crime: 1) more enforcement geared toward the drug supply, 2) 
enforcement targeting crime in general without trying to reduce crime risk factors, and 3) 
enforcement targeting drug demand (Sherman et al. 1997).  Much of the research from 
the 1990s focused on drug enforcement, but studies of large-scale federal drug 
crackdowns, crop eradications, and interdictions produced mixed results about 
effectiveness.  It is still unknown whether directed enforcement efforts in large cities 
simply displaced drug markets to other locations, or if drug crime reductions were 
sustainable for longer than a few months.  Nevertheless, communities continued to 
pressure local agencies for crackdowns on local drug markets and violent street gangs 
(Grinc 1998).   Some city-specific studies demonstrated that focusing police efforts 
against signs of physical disorder such as graffiti, litter, and broken windows could yield 
positive results (Skogan and Hartnett 1997).  Directed patrols, proactive arrest, and 
problem solving in specific locations could also be effective (Sherman et al. 1997). 
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Jurison and Williams (1997) recommend the following improvements for housing 
authorities plagued by crime and physical decay:   
1) PHA administrators must reestablish control over the types of tenants they admit.  This can 
include a set of “house rules” within the lease, requiring residents to carry photo ID or sign in 
guests, or creating a “no trespass list” for prior trouble makers.  A properly trained security force 
is key, which understands the rules, knows who belongs and who does not, and which frequently 
communicates with management. 
2) Management must deal with bad residents, either by citing infractions or by using evictions.  Some 
locations use a “three-strikes” escalating system of warnings, meetings with management, and 
finally eviction for those who repeatedly break rules.  Security and maintenance personnel should 
be used to identify and track infractions.   
3) Management must retain good residents.  They must have a detailed plan that implements all of 
the above concurrently.  They should also have an aggressive resident involvement program, such 
as the creation of a resident council.  Managers must be held responsible for their areas of 
responsibility, whether it is security, maintenance, or top management.  Agencies should have a 
strong vision, a pro-active focus, and an evaluation process that appraises staff based on 
established performance criteria. 
 
Criminology scholars in recent decades have been observing a shift from a crime 
control/professional model of policing to an emphasis on order maintenance, service 
provision, or other functions.  The values attached to each function determine the goals 
set by police organizations.  For example, a crime control model of policing values 
preventive crime control and criminal investigation (Zhao and Thurman 1997).  In 
addition to enforcement techniques, the crime control model could also include changing 
criminal laws or sentencing policy.  Mass media campaigns have been used to persuade 
criminals that offenses will be costly or to convince citizens to take personal crime 
prevention measures (Tonry and Farrington 1995).   
 
Many academics and police administrators argue that community policing 
represents a fundamental shift in the underlying philosophies of policing, from the crime 
control model to one of problem solving and officer and community empowerment (Zhao 
and Thurman 1997).  Officers are encouraged not only to deal with the immediate 
problem (i.e. a call for service), but also are encouraged to find a long term solution so 
the problem does not reoccur.  When police act cooperatively with citizens to solve 
community problems, they reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community 
upon itself.  This results in the reduction of citizen fear, increased police visibility, crime 
reduction and deterrence, and more accessibility to the public by the police (Grinc 1998; 
Kane 2000).   
 
Community policing means different things to different police agencies.  Options 
can include foot and bike patrols; order maintenance, or cleaning up neighborhoods and 
revitalizing areas; or using “canned” neighborhood crime prevention programs such as 
DARE or Neighborhood Watch (Maguire et al. 1997; Zhao and Thurman 1997).    
 
It is clear that examples of both the crime control model and the order 
maintenance model exist in the policies of the KCDC Security Patrol.  The KPD has a 
nationally recognized community policing program and community policing jargon is 
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incorporated into all KPD policies.  Knoxville may be unusual when compared to other 
cities because of the principle/agent relationship between the city police department and 
the public housing authority (KCDC).  However, the policies and practices of the KCDC 
Security Patrol are common in community policing programs in other large cities around 
the country.  For example, the Housing Authority of North Little Rock (Arkansas) and 
the North Little Rock Police Dept. wanted to establish police substations in the 
developments due to drug activities.  A PHDEP grant provided 2/3 of the necessary 
funds, while the city provided the other third in 1992 to establish the substations.  After 
one year, the program had expanded to 3 substations with a total of six police officers 
(Elliot 1996).   
 
Chicago is another example.  The Chicago Police Department’s community 
policing program has six components: 1) an orientation toward the needs of specific 
neighborhoods; 2) the assignment of officers to particular areas of geographic 
responsibility; 3) emergency calls are handled by designated response units, while non-
emergency calls are handled by regular beat officers; 4) a focus on the long term 
prevention of causes of neighborhood crime, such as prostitution and loitering youths; 5) 
beat officers solve problems by linking residents to services from other agencies; and 6) 
an emphasis on data collection for the identification of crime patterns and target areas 
(Lurigio and Skogan 1994). 
  
Measuring Police Effectiveness 
 
According to Kingsley Game (1979), “Evaluation of police policy presupposes 
the availability of several types of information.  Information is required on (1) the cost or 
price of the “product”; (2) measuring the effectiveness of the product, by some 
discernible criterion or criteria; (3) changes in effectiveness ascribable to policy change; 
and (4) last but far from least, realistic contextual knowledge of the policy environment, 
including bureaucratic knowledge of accepted methods and formats” (p. 7).   
 
Kessler and Duncan (1996) argue that traditional measures of police effectiveness 
(i.e., the number of calls answered, response times, and number of arrests) are often 
supplemented by measures of the number of incidents created by specific problems, the 
seriousness of incidents caused by the problem, and the number of referrals to other 
agencies to solve the problem.  Crime statistics about the locations, types, and 
frequencies of crimes are typically collected.  Reductions in the number of calls for 
service (or reported crime) are seen as indicators of a solved problem (Kessler and 
Duncan 1996).    
 
Quality of service from the police and police/PHA management relations receive 
little scholarly attention.  Criminal justice research is hampered because many police 
executives believe that PHAs belong to the federal government, and they perceive that 
PHAs do not cooperate with police.  HUD and police interest groups have found it 
necessary to sponsor meetings to discuss methods for agency cooperation (Holzman 
1996). 
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The Courts 
 
As Knoxville discovered, crime control policies in PHAs can be controversial and 
some have found their way into the courts.  In two cases, the ACLU sued on behalf of 
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) residents due to warrantless searches conducted in 
1989 (Summeries v. Chicago Housing Authority) and 1993 (Pratt et al. v. Chicago 
Housing Authority) by the Chicago police.  A judge issued an injunction against the 
warrantless searches and refused to lift it, despite 300 shooting incidents over 5 days 
during a gang war in 1994.  In response, President Clinton ordered the creation of a new 
search policy for all federally supported public housing in 1994, which allowed searches 
under emergency conditions and for maintenance inspections when given permission.  
The ACLU argued that most residents disliked the sweeps, while the CHA argued the 
opposite (Popkin et al. 1995).   
 
A comparative study of two housing projects in Chicago shows that residents saw 
PHDEP services and the sweeps in a positive light in 1995.  Although there is variation 
between the two housing developments studied, residents in both locations said they 
perceived a reduction in crime, and in one development residents reported a significant 
increase in the level of safety.  A majority felt that a “resweep” or additional sweeps were 
necessary to some degree.    Residents of both projects felt drug dealing outside had not 
been reduced; however, both felt shootings and fighting inside and outside buildings and 
squatting in vacant apartments had been significantly reduced (Popkin et al. 1995).    
 
PHAs use various procedures for evictions as a crime control measure based upon 
national policy.  During the 1996 State of the Union address, President Clinton 
announced a “one strike and you’re out” policy for public housing residents who 
committed crimes or sold drugs.  HUD subsequently created a “one-strike” regulation, 
C.F.R. sec 966.4 (authorized by section 1437d(1) (5) of the Cranston-Gonzalez National 
Affordable Housing Act of 1990).  The new regulation gives PHAs the power to evict 
any resident who commits criminal acts that threaten the health, safety, or quiet 
enjoyment of the PHA by other residents, or who commits any drug offense near or on 
PHA property.  In addition, C.F.R. sec 966.4 allows evictions when the “tenant, any 
member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant’s control, engages 
in criminal activity” (Hellegers 1999, p. 1).  Multiple lawsuits were filed as PHAs around 
the country began to evict individual tenants and entire households based on the actions 
of one family member or guest.  Many of the suits evoke the administrative law 
provisions from Chevron.   Evictions are also challenged based on the Double Jeopardy, 
Excessive Fines, and Substantive and Procedural Due Process clauses of the Constitution 
(Hellegers 1999).      
 
For several years, courts allowed the evictions.  One example is Charlotte 
Housing Authority v. Patterson (464 S.E.2d 68), in which the tenant, Jacqueline Rose, 
and her two daughters were evicted for the criminal activity of her son (Hellegers 1999).   
In Silence v. O’Brien, a lease clause was interpreted to allow a tenant to be evicted for 
immoral or illegal purposes, and if the tenant was aware of a guest’s illegal activities 
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(Hellegers 1999).   A more strict provision than the Silence case originated from Housing 
Authority of Decatur v. Brown.   The Decatur ruling said that a tenant must conduct 
himself and cause others on the premises to conduct themselves in a manner that does not 
affect neighbors or the safety and condition of the housing project (Hellegers 1999; 
Stasell 2001).   
 
The case law regarding tenant evictions has seen a reversal of direction in recent 
years.  The Court for the Eastern Division of Virginia “require[d] that lease terms be 
rationally related to a legitimate housing purpose” in Richmond Tenants Organization v. 
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (751 F. Supp. 1204 [E.D. Va. 1990]).  
As a result, a Richmond lease clause stating that a tenant could be evicted for off-premise 
misdemeanor convictions and on- or off-premise illegal drug or alcohol use or sale were 
not “reasonably related to a housing problem.”  In 1998, Pearlie Rucker and three other 
tenants of the Oakland Housing Authority were evicted for drug activities committed by 
family members or guests outside their apartments.  The legal standard from the ensuing 
case, Rucker v. Davis, allowed an innocent tenant to be evicted based on an individual 
court’s interpretation of whether the terms of the lease were “reasonable” (Hellegers 
1999).      
 
In January 2001, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed 
the earlier Rucker decision (Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113).  The Court found that 
despite the position taken by the federal government for several years, the 1990 Housing 
Act did not allow the eviction of tenants without some demonstration of individual 
culpability for the illegal actions of third parties.  The Court went on to say that HUD’s 
interpretation of the statute did not follow congressional intent, because it would lead to 
inequitable results in numerous cases. Housing authorities would have to prove that a 
tenant knew or should have known of the illegal activity of a third party and did nothing 
to prevent it (Stasell 2001).   
 
Comprehensive Crime Control 
 
By the late 1980s, some researchers, PHA staff, and policy makers were 
advocating collaborative efforts between PHA staff, the police, and residents in a 
community-involvement approach based on social control.  Unfortunately, the police 
tended to take a negative view of residents, the opposite was also true, and PHA 
managers were usually uncooperative (Popkin et al. 1995).  According to Skogan and 
Annan (1994), community involvement that includes socially imposed norms, 
neighborhood boundaries and identities, and a strong sense of social interaction and 
community have been unsuccessful in public housing.    
 
Studies of the public housing in New York, Boston, and San Francisco conclude 
that comprehensive, or combination approaches are the most effective in reducing crime 
in public housing (Popkin et al. 1999).  These programs contain multiple elements, 
including more law enforcement, tenant participation, social services (particularly drug 
prevention and intervention services), security measures, tenant screening, and better 
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PHA management practices.  Funding for the comprehensive Public Housing Drug 
Elimination Program (PHDEP) originated from the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which 
authorized HUD to fund this type of program.  PHDEP is a combination of all the above 
elements (Popkin et al. 1995).  By simultaneously funding PHDEP and HOPE VI, HUD 
can ameliorate poor physical conditions while promoting social cohesion and self-
sufficiency (Popkin et al. 1999). 
 
Feins, Epstein, and Widom (1997) believe that social services, youth activities, 
and effective management are more important in reducing crime than CPTED strategies.  
This could be why evaluations of CPTED alone tend to yield moderate empirical results.  
Aaron Podolefsky (1983) shows that crime prevention programs focusing on law 
enforcement alone will fail in low-income minority populations.  Podolefsky concludes 
that programs in high-rise developments must address the social problems linked to 
violence, including drug abuse, teen and youth employment, recreational opportunities, 
education programs, and infrastructure development. 
 
Crime Mapping and Analysis 
 
The use of maps to represent the locations of crime has existed for over 170 years.  
Large metropolitan police departments, such as New York’s, originally used huge wall 
maps to collect data on different types of crimes with different colored pins.  Although 
pins could demonstrate the locations of crime, it became increasingly difficult to track 
crime patterns over time as additional pins were added, thereby only proving useful for 
short periods of time (Harries 1999).   
 
There have been three major schools of study in the use of maps for research 
about crime and delinquency.  Beginning in France around 1830 and influencing England 
by the 1880s, the cartographic or geographic school studied whether social variables 
related to wealth or population density affected levels of crime.  The typological school 
that followed was concerned with the relationship between crime and the mental and 
physical characteristics of criminals.  The typological school dominated until the social 
ecology school gained prominence in the 1920s in the United States.  The social 
ecologists studied geographic regions within cities that had similar social characteristics, 
in an attempt to find a relationship to crime (Harries 1999).    
 
Computers were probably first used for crime mapping analysis in the mid-1960s 
in St. Louis, yet professional cartographers did not become interested until the 1970s.   
Early maps were produced with line printers, which limited the resolution and prevented 
the use of point data.  As late as the 1980s, printers, computer memory and other 
hardware inadequacies, nonexistent software, and high prices prohibited the widespread 
use of GIS crime mapping by law enforcement agencies or researchers (Griffith 1990; 
Harries 1999).  Today, high-quality color maps showing crime locations can be generated 
on a relatively inexpensive desktop computer.  Huge crime databases containing multiple 
variables about particular crimes at any point in time can be combined with modern 
mapping software that can represent an unlimited amount of geographic features. 
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 To date, the primary use of crime mapping by local law enforcement agencies has 
been the identification of crime trends, which allows agencies to better allocate resources 
during ongoing investigations or to direct preventative crime control measures.  An 
anthology published by the Police Executive Research Forum in 1998 provides multiple 
examples.  Martin, Barnes and Britt (1998) use GIS and crime data from Detroit to 
identify areas damaged during “Devil’s Night” in previous years to determine the best 
locations for additional police patrols and fire department personnel.  Reno (1998) uses 
crime mapping to locate areas with the highest rates of residential burglary in Shreveport, 
LA.  Reickenberg and Grube (1998) try to reduce traffic accidents in Illinois by analyzing 
a vehicle crash database maintained by the Illinois State Police.  The crash database 
contains information regarding crash location, crash type (i.e., property damage, injury, 
fatality), and the conditions of the driver and the roadway.  Santiago (1998) studies auto 
theft trends in Newark; Brown et al. (1998) identify burglary patterns in Aurora, 
Colorado; and Hubbs (1998) uses a sex offender database to identify repeat offenders 
living in proximity to a series of sexual assaults in Knoxville, Tennessee.   
  
 Although the primary use of GIS technology by local agencies has been related to 
enforcement practices, some researchers have used spatial analysis for policy 
recommendations.  Harris et al. (1998) are concerned about the availability of social 
services for released offenders in Delaware.  The problem is that many released inmates 
do not receive the assistance they need in the form of substance abuse treatment, mental 
health services, and employment training and placement.  According to Harris et al. 
(1998), recidivism rates in certain Delaware counties indicate that social services might 
not be “optimally aligned” (p. 61).  By using maps indicating the locations of released 
offenders and the sites of existing social service facilities, the Department of Corrections 
for Kent County was able to justify a new drug rehabilitation program (Harris et al. 
1998). 
 
The Linkage Between Crime and Area Characteristics 
 
Multiple studies in the fields of Sociology, Urban Studies, Criminology, and 
Geography provide evidence of relationships between crime or victimization rates and 
the presence of urban areas characterized by physical decay, proximity to commercial 
areas, and containing overcrowded, disadvantaged residents (Pettiway 1982).  As I 
researched the literature regarding crime and spatial analysis, there were ample examples 
of studies regarding neighborhood or community characteristics and crime, or the 
relationship between an offender’s residence and the location of the targets of criminal 
activities.   
 
Nevertheless, there is very little literature regarding the spatial analysis of crime 
in public housing, and I could find no other study utilizing computerized mapping 
technology.  To quote a recent HUD publication, “[T]o date, this particular application of 
GIS technology is exceedingly rare” (Hyatt and Holzman 1999, p. 3).  Another problem I 
addressed was the necessity to exclude literature that was not concerned with the 
importance of geographic location, or I risked falling into the plethora of studies that 
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evaluate individual socio-economic or demographic characteristics and their relationships 
to crime.   
 
Shaw and McKay’s (1942) landmark study of juvenile delinquency is an example 
from the social ecology “Chicago” school.  They mapped thousands of juvenile 
delinquency incidents, finding a link between delinquency and urban socioeconomic 
conditions, with declining crime rates in concentric zones away from high-crime rate 
areas.  Shaw and McKay developed a theoretical explanation of varying crime rates 
across social areas, finding four structural characteristics of the community that increase 
crime by eroding community social organization: 1) low economic status, 2) ethnic 
heterogeneity, 3) high population density, and 4) residential mobility.  According to 
Brantingham et al. (1976), “The core propositions of twentieth-century American 
criminology are drawn from (or represent reactions to) offender residence maps of 
Chicago and a number of other cities which were prepared by Shaw and McKay and their 
students and disciples from the late 1920s to the 1950s” (p. 261).  A study by Sampson 
and Lauritsen (1994) reveals that the community level research since the mid 1970s 
generally supports Shaw and McKay’s (1942) theoretical model.   
 
Others scholars study the effects of area characteristics and race upon the level of 
crime.  Comparisons based on race with regard to crime rates are overly simplistic 
without first understanding the community context.  If the causes of black crime are not 
unique, then crime rates should vary in accordance with the same community conditions 
under which white crime rates vary.  For example, the predictors of white robbery are the 
same as those for blacks.  Yet multiple researchers have been unable to explain the 
greater effect of black family disruptions on black crime, when compared to the lesser 
effect of white family disruptions on white crime, even when controlling for region, 
population density, and age.  The problem is that it is often impossible to claim that 
whites and blacks share the same environment.  In 1980, 70 percent of all non-Hispanic 
whites did not live in poverty areas of the ten largest U.S. cities, while only 16 percent of 
blacks did not live in poverty in the same cities.  The inescapable fact remains that a 
black resident of Harlem is less likely to live to the age of forty than a rural resident of 
Bangladesh (Sampson and Wilson 1998).  According to Sampson (1987), “the worst 
urban contexts in which whites reside are considerably better than the average context of 
black communities” (p. 354).    
 
Inner city residents are less able to find jobs, may have access to only poor-
quality schools, are less likely to find marriage partners, and lack conventional role 
models.  These social conditions have been worsened by the flight of middle-and upper-
income blacks to the suburbs and deliberate policy decisions that have concentrated the 
poor and minorities in public housing.  Community groups prevented the building of 
public housing in their neighborhoods, federal policy allowed the de facto segregation of 
blacks from urban housing markets, and local governments resisted the rehabilitation of 
their public housing units (Sampson and Wilson 1998).  Lax enforcement of city building 
codes directly led to the deterioration of inner city neighborhoods in Chicago (Hirsch 
1983).   
  
 
31
 
Sampson and Wilson (1998) write, “The most important determinant of the 
relationship between race and crime is the differential distribution of blacks in 
communities characterized by (1) structural social disorganization and (2) cultural social 
isolation…” (p. 105).  Social disorganization refers to a lack of social networks in a 
community, including acquaintances, kinship ties across generations, the level of 
anonymity, and organizational participation.  Cultural social isolation refers to the 
existence of mutual distrust, institutional instability, poverty, heterogeneity, and other 
features of urban communities that prevent communication and the attainment of 
common values among diverse groups (Sampson and Wilson 1998).   
 
Park and Burgess (1925) characterize urban ghettos as “natural areas” constrained 
by cultural and topographical barriers.  Brantingham and Brantingham (1975) reveal that 
burglaries occurred at higher rates at the edges of these natural barriers than in the 
interior of the ghetto.  In a 1982 study, Pettiway analyzed the movements of black and 
white offenders, from ghetto to nonghetto spaces in Milwaukee County, to determine 
whether race and residential segregation prevents offenders from looking for crime 
opportunities in urban areas outside where they live.  Milwaukee has a single, large 
ghetto area with a fairly equal distribution of offenders and targets.  Pettiway’s (1982) 
research shows that ghetto dwellers remain within the ghetto to commit most offenses, 
ghetto dwellers are more likely to commit crimes on the edges of the ghetto than 
nonghetto residents, nonghetto residents typically select crime locations in nonghetto 
areas, and black offenders tend to move outside the area in which they live more than 
whites.    
 
In one of the few spatial analyses regarding crime in public housing, McNulty and 
Holloway (2000) hypothesize that the relation between race and crime will decrease in 
strength and magnitude as the distance from public housing projects increases.  The 
characteristics of neighborhoods near public housing closely resembles public housing 
itself.  Their primary hypothesis is: if public housing is a hub of crime, and has 
predominately minority residents, then the nearby neighborhoods will have crimes 
committed mostly by minorities at higher rates than other areas.  Other studies show a 
relation between crime and minority neighborhoods, but they do not examine the 
presence of public housing, which might bias the magnitude of the relationship.  McNulty 
and Holloway argue that public housing creates institutional, social, and spatial 
disadvantages for the residents living there.  Their hypothesis holds for serious crimes 
such as murder, rape, assault, and public order crime, but not for robbery or property 
crime (McNulty and Holloway 2000). 
 
Some authors demonstrate stable relationships between area characteristics and 
crime rates over time, such as Shannon’s (1984) research in the City of Racine, and 
Schuerman and Kobrin’s (1986) study of Los Angeles County.  Others identify a linkage 
between city centers and crime.  Fabrikant (1979) writes that the frequency of crime in 
cities is negatively related to the distance from the Central Business District.  
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Brantingham and Brantingham (1984) show that crime is concentrated in central cities, 
but declines toward the outer edges of the metropolitan area. 
 
However, associations found in data regarding social areas might be invalid if 
they are applied to individuals, which Robinson (1950) calls the “ecological fallacy.”  
There is usually homogeneity within geographic areas and considerable heterogeneity 
between areas regarding resident characteristics that are related to criminal behavior.  The 
researcher is more likely to find high correlations as the level of aggregation increases 
(Brantingham et al. 1976).  Gottfredson et al. (1991) add that differences in crime rates 
for social areas could be a result of contextual and/or compositional mechanisms.   
 
A contextual explanation involves the proposition that the social organization of an area influences  
the individuals who inhabit it, such as might occur if a community loses control over its  
inhabitants.  A compositional explanation involves the proposition that the differences in crime  
rates in different areas are a result of the aggregate characteristics of the individuals who inhabit  
the areas such as might occur if a community recruits crime-prone people.  In Wilson and  
Hernstein’s (1985) words, “A neighborhood may have more crime because conditions there cause  
it or because certain kinds of neighborhoods attract persons predisposed to criminality” (p. 291).   
(Gottfredson et al. 1991, p. 201) 
 
One branch of the literature explores offenders’ decision-making processes 
regarding crime location.  White (1932) finds that offenders who commit crimes against 
persons do so close to their places of residence, yet those wanting to commit property 
crimes do so in a dispersed pattern in order to remain anonymous.  Others, such as Pope 
(1980), demonstrate that crime decreases with increasing distance from the offender’s 
home.  For example, 52 percent of all burglaries occur within one mile of the burglar’s 
residence (Pope 1980).  According to Repetto (1974), 90 percent of robberies occur 
within 1.5 miles of the offender’s residence, with a 0.6 mile mean distance traveled for 
robbery.    
 
Some economics and criminology scholars see offenders as rational actors, 
seeking to minimize their costs (i.e., time, effort, transportation, the costs of learning 
about an unfamiliar target area, escape options, the risk of being identified in a cohesive 
community, and local police practices), while at the same time maximizing their 
opportunities (i.e. staying in areas with high population densities or more affluent areas) 
(Ehrlich 1973; Fabrikant 1979; Hakim 1980; Harries 1980; Deutsch et al. 1987).  Authors 
such as Felson and Cohen (1980) and Cohen et al. (1981) believe additional societal 
factors should be considered that might increase an individual’s inclination to commit 
crime, such as:  
1) the tools, skills, and weapons available to offenders 
2) the level of guardianship of target property by people 
3) the attractiveness of targeted people or property (i.e., wealth, race, physical condition, or age 
of a person; or the size, weight, or ease of illegal removal of property) 
4) the distribution of offenders 
5) the timing of offender activities as compared to the activities of potential targets and their 
guardians.   
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Waller and Okihiro (1978) find several similar variables that are important 
indicators of whether homes are burglarized, including: ease of access (i.e. low 
occupancy, or visual obstructions), proximity to public housing (with a possible 
concentration of potential offenders), and high- income levels (or having something of 
value that is worth stealing).  Brantingham and Jeffery (1981) offer the “criminal event 
model” as an explanation of differences in neighborhood crime rates.  The dense nature 
of urban areas offers criminals proximal crime opportunities that are an important 
independent variable.  Youthful offenders in particular commit crimes close to home, 
because they have limited mobility and many targets exist for theft or social order crimes, 
such as vandalism (Brantingham and Jeffery 1981).   
 
Press (1970) and Mehay (1977) argue that the dominant form of externalities 
created by new allocations of law enforcement personnel is the motivation of criminals to 
relocate their illegal activities to adjacent areas.  More officers in an area likely reduces 
the number of criminals and the amount of criminal activity.  As the differential in police 
force between the areas receiving more officers and the adjacent areas increases, the 
number of offenders “spilling over” into adjacent areas to commit crimes and the total 
number of offenders in the adjacent areas increase.  Consequently, the allocation of 
police resources has two effects: crime reduction and crime displacement (Fabrikant 
1979).  According to Hakim (1980), one would expect more resources to be spent on 
policing as the level of crime increases, just as one would expect less to be spent as crime 
levels drop.  However, his research indicates that wealthier communities attract more 
crimes, resulting in higher police expenditures.  As a result, the deterrence efforts of 
small, rural departments are likely not to deter nonlocal offenders from being attracted to 
wealthy residents, their property, or commercial businesses (Hakim 1980). 
 
Literature Summary 
 
The policies intended to control crime in Knoxville’s public housing are 
representative of law enforcement trends in the literature.  For example, the physical 
safety improvements made to the KCDC sites are based upon the theories of CPTED 
found in the literature of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s.   
 
The 1980s was also characterized by aggressive law enforcement.  President Bush 
created the Office of National Drug Control Policy in 1989, undercover and direct 
enforcement efforts were emphasized, and the 1980s saw the introduction of aggressive 
seizures of property under the 1984 Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (Grinc 1998).  My 
own research demonstrates a trend of aggressive law enforcement in sentencing policy 
during the 1980s at the federal and state levels.  Examples include policies such as Three-
Strikes, Truth-in-Sentencing, and new Mandatory Minimums (Barbrey and Clement 
2001).  The privatization of Knoxville streets in October 1992 and the Security Patrol’s 
subsequent use of “No Trespass” notices, as well as the assignment of one Security Patrol 
officer to each study site in February 1993, all follow the aggressive law enforcement 
trend.   
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During the late 1980s, HUD changed its eviction policy that required pre-eviction 
hearings in order to make it easier to evict suspected drug dealers.  The Chicago Housing 
Authority used this change as justification to conduct Operation Clean Sweep in 1988.   
CHA’s enforcement actions resulted in lawsuits brought by the ACLU.  A judge issued 
an injunction in 1994 to stop the warrantless searches of occupied apartments.  President 
Clinton created a new search policy for all federally supported housing in 1994, allowing 
searches for emergencies or maintenance only.   During the 1996 State of the Union, 
Clinton demonstrated a harsher stance, announcing a new “one strike and you’re out” 
policy for public housing residents who commit crimes or sold drugs.  Because of court 
challenges, an agency must now prove that a resident knew or should have known that a 
third party was engaging in illegal activities and did nothing to prevent them.   KCDC’s 
“One Strike” eviction policy that was added to KCDC leases in September 1996 reflects 
the federal policies and court cases.   
 
Despite the shaky support for CPTED measures alone, researchers have 
succeeded in making an argument between large, densely populated public housing and 
crime.  The current trend is to demolish the problematic public housing sites and to build 
single-family homes.  That is exactly why College Homes was demolished at the end of 
1998 with funding from HUD’s HOPE IV grant program.   
 
The March 1999 team-based approach to policing includes multiple components 
that represent the idea of Community Policing.  Many of the tactics employed by the 
Security Patrol are similar to the Community Policing policies used by other cities, 
including Chicago. 
 
The research from the 1990s focused on drug enforcement and found mixed 
results about the effectiveness of aggressive enforcement tactics.  The city-specific 
studies said that directed efforts against social order crimes and crimes in specific 
locations could be somewhat effective.  Others researchers in the late 1990s like Jurison 
and Williams (1997) said that housing projects should control who they admit as tenants, 
and they must get rid of problem tenants (via eviction through some system of 
infractions, or an escalating system of warnings).  A new residency applicant screening 
process was implemented in the KCDC study sites in September 2000.   
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Data and Study Site Selection 
 
KPD has extensive crime data, including calls-for-service (from the 911 system), 
Part I serious crimes, and Part II Index non-serious crimes.  I chose to use the Part I data 
for two reasons.  First, Part I crimes are commonly used in the criminology literature.   
Serious felony crime is the basis of most federal law enforcement policy, and it is 
regularly reported by local law enforcement agencies to the FBI for its yearly Uniform 
Crime Reports.  Second, KPD has a highly trained computer and GIS staff that regularly 
analyze the Part I data, which makes it readily available.   
 
Ideally, the timeframe for this study should begin in 1987 when KCDC began 
exploring CPTED measures, or in 1989 when the KPD/KCDC contractual relationship 
began to evolve.  I was originally forced into a 1992-2001 timeframe because KPD’s data 
prior to 1992 exists in another computer operating system, and the earlier data requires 
extensive manipulation to make it useable.   The Part II data were available, yet KPD 
seldom uses it for analysis, it would require considerable effort by KPD to retrieve the 
data from multiple databases, and I would have to conduct extensive data corrections.  
Calls for service are an indicator of crime problems, yet they may provide a distorted 
picture of the magnitude or type of problem.  My future research (discussed in Chapter 5) 
will include a comparison of the Part I and 911 data, which KPD also gave me for the 
1992-2001 timeframe.    
 
KPD Lieutenant Robert Hubbs and John Venn, KPD’s Crime Analysis Manager, 
provided the Part I and 911 crime data and the Knoxville and Knox County map themes 
necessary to use the Arcview software.   Because it had been several years since I used 
Arcview, Hubbs spent many hours showing me how to manipulate the map themes, 
operate the query function, and correct the raw database.  In return for the data and 
assistance from the KPD staff, I gave KPD copies of the new incident location map 
themes after I spent weeks removing incorrect address entries.   
 
As already mentioned in Chapter I, there are seven family-oriented KCDC sites 
that are the focus of this research.4  Western Heights is the oldest and largest public 
housing development in Knoxville, opening in the 1940s and currently holding 688 units.  
The newest site is Montgomery Village, which opened in the 1970s with 452 units.  The 
remaining sites are Austin Homes (329 units), Walter P. Taylor Homes (500 units),  
 
 
                                                 
4 These sites are not the only KCDC public housing properties in Knoxville, but they are the only sites 
where the Security Patrol operates.  Consequently, the other KCDC sites were not subjected to the policies 
that are the focus of this study.  Other KCDC public housing projects typically serve the elderly or 
handicapped, and do not have large crime problems (Hubbs 2002).  The study sites accounted for 71% of 
the total KCDC housing units in 2000 (KCDC 1997b). 
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Table 1.   
PHDEP Grant Funding of the Security Patrol 
 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Dollars 161000 291400 544729 466131 799000 788004 809570 943819 727654 804520 553865 651893 755020
 
 
Christenberry Heights (326 units), Lonsdale Homes (300 units) (KCDC 1998a), and 
College Homes (320 units) (KCDC 1998b.). 5   
 
Funds Spent 
 
 Game (1979) recommends that one must determine the cost, or price of a policy.  
The cost of the Security Patrol is summarized in Table 1 above, which traces the constant 
dollars allocated to cover the cost of the KPD/KCDC contract in KCDC’s yearly PHDEP 
grant applications.  Wilma White at KCDC graciously provided the data for Table 1. 
 
Using Arcview Software to Collect/Filter Crime Incident Data 
 
For each incident of crime in the KPD database, there is an associated street 
address (including a number and street name), a description of the crime, time of day, day 
of week, month, KPD traffic zone where the incident occurred, and several other 
identifiers that I did not use.6  The Arcview software allows the user to place a “pin,” or 
dot, or other graphical character at the geographical location of any variable the software 
recognizes (e.g., a physical street address, or X,Y map coordinate).  Because the KPD  
database only contains street addresses, KPD provided an Arcview compatible map layer, 
or “theme,” that contains a pin at the location of every street address in the City of 
Knoxville.  Arcview matched the addresses in this theme to the addresses in the database 
to create pin maps showing the location of every crime in Knoxville for which it 
recognized an address.7  KPD also provided map themes showing Knoxville city streets, 
                                                 
5 College Homes was built between 1938-1940, and was demolished during the winter of 1998-’99 with 
HOPE VI grant funding from HUD.  Demolition began in December 1998.  The housing project will be 
replaced with two-family rental duplexes and mixed-income single-family homes  (KCDC 1998b).   I was 
initially concerned that the elimination of this site would affect the total number of crimes per year in the 
KCDC sites; however, the number of reported Part I incidents in College Homes averaged only 1.14 crimes 
per year.   
6  My first manipulation of the database was to divide it into separate files representing each year.   
Arcview 3.2 functioned slowly when ten years of pins were placed on a single map.  This also simplified 
the process of creating maps showing different types of crimes or other variables for a single year.   
7 Because most of the errors in the database are due to misspellings or omissions (i.e., leaving the word 
“Pike” off an address on Middlebrook Pike; e.g. an entry reading “4005 Middlebrook”), approximately 
25% of the raw database for each year has addresses with errors.  Naturally, I wanted to be sure that 
Arcview placed pins in the correct locations.  A complete description of the Arcview address match 
functions and my decision rules are included in Appendix B.   Ultimately, I was able to drop the “No 
match” score from approximately 25% to 13% per year.  No Match entries are those that the software could 
find an address “match score” less than 75 on a scale of 1-100.  The default threshold for a “Partial Match” 
was < 75.  Although a missing data level or error rate of 13% will seem high to most social scientists, a 
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building footprints, curb edges (for streets and parking lots), and bodies of water, which 
permits me to create detailed maps of Knoxville, showing both incidents of crime and 
surrounding geographical features.  The building footprint theme is important to the 
regression analysis, which will be discussed later. 
 
 One map theme created by KPD shows the boundaries of the KPD traffic zones, 
which are used for personnel assignments and data collection purposes.  This theme is 
vital to my analysis, because KPD created a separate traffic zone representing the 
perimeter of each KCDC housing site protected by the Security Patrol.  Consequently, 
this map layer shows the physical boundaries of the policy implementations.  By using 
the Arcview software to identify the separate incidents of crime that occurred within the 
KCDC study sites (as determined by the traffic zones), I can compare the level of crime 
in KCDC to the level of crime in the rest of the Knoxville to determine whether the 
policies were effective.    
 
To demonstrate how this is done, Figure 2 below shows all the incidents of crime 
for 1997 in a portion of Knoxville that includes three public housing sites.  Figure 3 is an  
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Figure 2.   All Part I Crimes in Knoxville (1997) 
                                                                                                                                                 
database with this level of incorrect locations is common for GIS software users, particularly when street 
addresses are used to locate pins instead of specific X,Y map coordinates.   The use of a global positioning 
system (GPS) at the data collection phase (e.g., the KPD could install GPS units in their cruisers or radios) 
would eliminate the high error rate; however, the KPD and most local police agencies at present cannot 
afford or justify the necessary hardware (Hubbs 2002). 
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Figure 3.  Part I Crimes Intersecting Public Housing (shown in yellow) 
  
example of using Arcview to show only those crimes that “intersect,” or fall within, the 
three shown public housing sites (appearing as yellow pins) where the new crime control 
policies were implemented.    
 
After obtaining the total number of crimes per year in the City (KCDC included) 
and for KCDC separately, I subtracted the latter from the former to calculate the number 
of incidents occurring in the population of Knoxville outside public housing.   Table 2 
below illustrates the process. 
 
Not only can I count the total incidents of crime by year, but I can also use the 
software to count the different types of Part I crime (aggravated assault, auto theft, 
burglary, larceny, murder, rape, or robbery) by using the query tool.8     In Figure 4, 
murders in a portion of Knoxville are indicated by green stars; all other crimes still 
appear in red. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The “query” function of the software allows the user to place pins for entries in a database that meet user-
defined criteria.  For example, if one wanted to see all the murders in Knoxville, one would type in the 
query box:  ([crime] = “murder”).  Arcview would then highlight only those pins in the theme where the 
“crime type” variable was a murder.  Once highlighted, the separate pins can be saved as a new, separate 
theme with a different pin format.   
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Table 2. 
Calculation of Total Part I Crimes by Year  
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Totals
City 15232 13372 13257 13658 10750 11162 10162 9489 9459 10254 116795
KCDC 759 721 778 889 523 487 435 418 446 421 5877
City (KCDC 
exclusive)  14473 12651 12479 12769 10227 10675 9727 9071 9013 9833 110918
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Figure 4.  All Murders in Knoxville (1997) 
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Once I knew how many incidents of a particular crime type occurred citywide, I 
used the intersect function as in Figure 3 to determine which incidents occurred in the 
KCDC sites.  Basic subtraction (as in Table 1) allows me to separate the incidents for the 
two populations.   The results are in Table 3.   Most of the PHDEP grant applications 
compiled by KCDC contain a table showing the percent change in crime from one year to 
the next.  Using the data from Table 3, I calculated percent changes in Table 4 for the two 
separate populations.  
 
Ideally, the next step should be to calculate crime rates for the two populations 
using the ratio of number of crimes to population.  Population data for the entire City of 
Knoxville can be estimated from 1990 and 2000 census data.  Unfortunately, population 
data for the KCDC study sites alone is only available for 1999 and 2000.  KCDC uses an 
Internet site to report resident census-type information to HUD, and the same site also 
generates printed reports.  At present, KCDC can only use the system to generate data for 
the two years (White 2002).  I could estimate KCDC population using the available 
information; however, I would be unable to account for the population of College Homes 
prior to its demolition in 1998, which was not reported.      
 
Several of the PHDEP grant application from KCDC included a calculation for a 
rate of crime occurrence, or the ratio of crimes to the number of households.   Again, the 
number of households for the City of Knoxville was available from the 1990 and 2000 
census.9  There is a 9.5% increase in the number of households between 1990 and 2000, 
or a .95% increase per year.  Starting in 1990, I added .95% to the total number of 
households for each year between 1990 and 2000, and again for 2001.   
 
Calculating the number of households for KCDC is more complicated, but is 
possible.  KCDC reports for 1999 and 2000 contain the total number of units in each 
housing site and the total number of occupied units.  I use an average number of occupied 
units to represent the number of KCDC households.10  To ensure that KCDC occupied  
units was roughly equivalent to the census data for households, I compared the average 
family size for Knoxville in 2000 (2.12) to the average family size in the KCDC sites 
(2.44) (KCDC 1999; KCDC 2000a; American FactFinder 2002).  The rate of occurrence 
of crime is reported in Table 5, using my estimates for the number of households and the 
number of crimes from Table 4.   Table 5 is translated into Figures 5 and 6 below. 
 
 
                                                 
9 http://factfinder.census.gov/home 
10 By using the total number of units per site and the number of occupied units for 1999 and 2000, I 
calculated the average number of occupied units (1958 households) and an average occupancy rate (77%) 
for KCDC for the two years.  College Homes consisted of 320 units; assuming 77% occupancy, it would 
contain 246 households prior to demolition.  Given the average occupancy rate, using the total number of 
units to represent households was not appropriate.  Consequently, I assumed 1958 households (remaining 
constant) for 1998-2001.  Because College Homes was demolished in Dec. 1998 and some residents were 
relocated during 1997, I added the 246 households in College Homes to 1958 for each year between 1992 
and 1997, equaling 2204 households per year.   
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Table 3. 
Calculation11 of Total Part I Crimes by Type 
for the City (KCDC inclusive), KCDC Only, and City (KCDC exclusive) 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
City (including KCDC) 
Agg assault 2166 2202 2267 2335 836 844 825 738 719 1138
Auto theft 1878 1612 1610 1772 1599 1530 1276 1364 1448 1277
Burglary 3339 2819 2691 2810 2337 2040 1647 1389 1108 1701
Larceny 6905 6029 5925 5900 5299 6093 5762 5341 5631 5349
Murder 35 14 24 20 24 19 34 20 21 16
Rape 117 99 109 103 64 91 78 68 76 134
Robbery 792 597 631 718 591 545 540 569 456 639
Total= 15232 13372 13257 13658 10750 11162 10162 9489 9459 10254
           
KCDC Only 
Agg assault 325 328 352 378 128 132 111 125 89 115
Auto theft 52 56 56 94 63 58 58 58 69 44
Burglary 196 156 133 163 125 110 90 85 99 89
Larceny 134 141 177 185 146 151 130 116 136 120
Murder 9 2 5 4 3 2 3 1 4 2
Rape 11 12 10 7 7 5 8 5 9 12
Robbery 32 26 45 60 51 29 35 28 40 39
Total= 759 721 778 891 523 487 435 418 446 421
           
City minus KCDC = City (KCDC exclusive) 
Agg assault 1841 1874 1915 1957 708 712 714 613 630 1023
Auto theft 1826 1556 1554 1678 1536 1472 1218 1306 1379 1233
Burglary 3143 2663 2558 2647 2212 1930 1557 1304 1009 1612
Larceny 6771 5888 5748 5715 5153 5942 5632 5225 5495 5229
Murder 26 12 19 16 21 17 31 19 17 14
Rape 106 87 99 96 57 86 70 63 67 122
Robbery 760 571 586 658 540 516 505 541 416 600
Total= 14473 12651 12479 12767 10227 10675 9727 9071 9013 9833
 
KCDC Proportion of  Total Crime [total KCDC (only)/total City (including KCDC)]   
 .0498 .0539 .0587 .0652 .0487 .0436 .0428 .0441 .0472 .0411
                                                 
11 The FBI changed the UCR system in June 2000 in an attempt to gain more accurate information about 
the crimes being reported.  The new system resulted in new sub-categories of violent crimes.  Because of 
the new categories, each crime incident may result in listings in multiple categories (e.g., a burglary could 
also be listed as vandalism depending on the circumstances).  The KPD staff believed that the new system 
tends to elevate the number of reported total crimes.  Beginning in 2000, a separate "theft" category 
appeared in the KPD database.  I added these to the larceny category, as they were minor in nature, such as 
thefts from buildings or vehicles, and they were proportional to the pre-2000 larceny category. 
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Table 4. 
Percent Change in Crime Types by Year 
for KCDC and City (KCDC exclusive) 
 
KCDC Only 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agg assault n/a 0.92% 7.3% 7.4% -66.1% 3.1% -15.9% 12.6% -28.8% 29.2%
Auto theft n/a 7.7% 0.0% 67.9% -33.0% -7.9% 0.0% 0.0% 19.0% -36.2%
Burglary n/a -20.0% -14.8% 22.6% -23.3% -12.0% -18.2% -5.6% 16.5% -10.1%
Larceny n/a 5.2% 25.5% 4.5% -21.0% 3.4% -13.9% -10.8% 17.2% -11.8%
Murder n/a -78.0% 250.0% -20.0% -25.0% -33.3% 50.0% -66.7% 400.0% -50.0%
Rape n/a 9.1% -16.7% -30.0% 0.0% -28.6% 60.0% -37.5% 80.0% 33.3%
Robbery n/a -18.7% 73.1% 33.3% -15.0% -43.1% 20.7% -20.0% 42.9% -2.5%
 % change of  
total crime n/a -5% 7.90% 14.50% -41.30% -6.90% -10.70% -3.90% 6.70% -5.60%
           
City (KCDC exclusive) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agg assault n/a 1.8% 2.2% 2.2% -63.8% 0.6% 0.3% -14.1% 2.8% 62.4%
Auto theft n/a -14.8% -0.1% 8.0% -8.5% -4.2% -17.3% 7.2% 5.6% -10.6%
Burglary n/a -15.3% -3.9% 3.5% -16.4% -12.7% -19.3% -16.2% -22.6% 59.8%
Larceny n/a -13.0% -2.4% -0.6% -9.8% 15.3% -5.2% -7.2% 5.2% -4.8%
Murder n/a -53.8% 58.3% -15.8% 31.3% -19.0% 82.4% -38.7% -10.5% -17.6%
Rape n/a -17.9% 13.8% -3.0% -40.6% 50.9% -18.6% -10.0% 6.3% 82.1%
Robbery n/a -24.9% 2.6% 12.3% -17.9% -4.4% -2.1% 7.1% -23.1% 44.2%
 % change of  
total crime n/a -12.6% -1.40% 2.30% -19.90% 4.40% -8.90% -6.70% -0.60% 9.10%
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Table 5. 
Rate of Occurrence of Part I Crime by Type for KCDC and City (KCDC exclusive) 
 
KCDC (#incidents / #households) 
Estimated 
Households 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 2204 1958 1958 1958 1958
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agg assault 0.1475 0.1488 0.1597 0.1715 0.0581 0.0599 0.0567 0.0638 0.0455 0.0587
Auto theft 0.0236 0.0254 0.0254 0.0426 0.0286 0.0263 0.0296 0.0296 0.0352 0.0225
Burglary 0.0889 0.0708 0.0603 0.0740 0.0567 0.0499 0.0460 0.0434 0.0506 0.0455
Larceny 0.0608 0.0640 0.0803 0.0839 0.0662 0.0685 0.0664 0.0592 0.0695 0.0613
Murder 0.0041 0.0009 0.0023 0.0018 0.0014 0.0009 0.0015 0.0005 0.0020 0.0010
Rape 0.0050 0.0054 0.0045 0.0032 0.0032 0.0023 0.0041 0.0026 0.0046 0.0061
Robbery 0.0145 0.0118 0.0204 0.0272 0.0231 0.0132 0.0179 0.0143 0.0204 0.0199
Total 0.3444 0.3271 0.3530 0.4043 0.2373 0.2210 0.2222 0.2135 0.2278 0.2150
           
City (KCDC exclusive) (#incidents / #households) 
Estimated  
Households 71309 71986 72670 73360 74057 74761 75471 76188 76650 77378
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Agg assault 0.0258 0.0260 0.0264 0.0267 0.0096 0.0095 0.0095 0.0080 0.0082 0.0132
Auto theft 0.0256 0.0216 0.0214 0.0229 0.0207 0.0197 0.0161 0.0171 0.0180 0.0159
Burglary 0.0441 0.0370 0.0352 0.0361 0.0299 0.0258 0.0206 0.0171 0.0132 0.0208
Larceny 0.0950 0.0818 0.0791 0.0779 0.0696 0.0795 0.0746 0.0686 0.0717 0.0676
Murder 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Rape 0.0015 0.0012 0.0014 0.0013 0.0008 0.0012 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0016
Robbery 0.0107 0.0079 0.0081 0.0090 0.0073 0.0069 0.0067 0.0071 0.0054 0.0078
Total 0.2030 0.1757 0.1717 0.1740 0.1381 0.1428 0.1289 0.1191 0.1176 0.1271
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Figure 5.  Occurrence Rates of Part I Crimes in KCDC Study Sites 
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Figure 6.  Occurrence Rates of Part I Crimes City-wide (KCDC exclusive) 
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A Methodological Problem Emerges 
 
Although I do not intend to delve into my findings until Chapter 4, one can easily 
see from Figures 5 and 6 that something happened between 1995 and 1996 in KCDC.  
Initially I was very excited about the tremendous crime reduction in Figure 5.  
Unfortunately, there were several occurrences that might explain the drop which have 
nothing to do with policies under study.  First, as Table 1 indicates, the timing of the 
downturn coincides with the two years (1995 and 1996) during which the most money 
was spent on the KCDC/KPD contract.  A reduction in crime caused by the spending of 
more money on law enforcement personnel is a simple, logical explanation.  Second, the 
’95-’96 timeframe also coincides with the arrests of several gang leaders by federal and 
state authorities.  These two confounding factors would make it difficult for me to 
separate the effects of the policies.   
 
Seeking additional insight into possible explanations for the drastic crime 
reduction in KCDC, I showed the above tables and figures to the KPD computer analysis 
staff.  Not only did they tell me that they had previously found similar results, but they 
warned me of a potential methodological problem that occurred during the data-
collection phase within the KPD.  Specifically, they believed someone on KPD’s staff 
had counted all assaults as aggravated assaults for the years preceding 1996.  The ’95-’96 
reduction reveals when the problem was corrected.  Assuming the problem is true, their 
concern about this problem calls into question the validity of any findings prior to 1996.   
 
Removing improperly included simple assaults is not possible.  I could subtract 
the total number of simple assaults to adjust the total number of aggravated assault 
incidents and the total number of crimes, yet it is impossible to determine which 
individual incidents should be removed, making it impossible to subtract the correct 
number of KCDC incidents and non-KCDC incidents.  Also, I would be unable to 
accurately adjust the total number of crimes per census tract, which would preclude using 
tract-level census data for later regression analyses.   
 
Reducing the timeframe to 1996-2001 solved several problems.  First, it 
eliminated the methodological concerns and the confounding factors regarding the pre-
1996 data.  Second, the list of implemented policies I knew about grew from an initial 
four to a total of seven policies during the research for Chapter 1.  By reducing the 
timeframe, I was able to shorten the list of policies to be evaluated to four, with two years 
(1996 and 2000) seeing no policies as comparison years.    
 
The remaining policies to be evaluated are: 
1. A “One Strike” eviction policy added to KCDC leases in Sept. 1996 (1997 
impact) 
2. The demolition of the College Homes housing project in Dec. 1998 (1998 impact-
residents were moved out early in the year) 
3. A new team-based approach to policing, implemented in March 1999 (1999 
impact) 
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4. A new residency applicant screening process in Sept. 2000 (2001 impact). 
 
The Problems With Surveys in Public Housing 
 
Some of the literature mentioned in Chapter 2 uses socio-economic or 
demographic area characteristics to search for patterns in crime.  In addition, multiple 
sources mentioned the use of customer satisfaction or victimization surveys to gauge 
policy effectiveness or measure factors such as “cultural social isolation” and “social 
disorganization” (i.e. Sampson and Wilson 1998).   Given the available literature, I felt it 
was necessary to gather some form of data regarding the above types of variables to 
obtain an accurate understanding of the factors influencing crime in Knoxville’s public 
housing. 
 
The Gwaisda et al. (1997) multi-year study of residents in Chicago housing 
projects is illustrative of the problems faced by researchers wanting to collect information 
about public housing.  They conducted four waves of a cross-sectional, personal 
interview survey in nine Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) locations, beginning in May 
1994.  Funded by the National Institute of Justice, the study was to be an evaluation of 
CHA’s Anti-Drug Initiative (ADI).  The ADI included law enforcement actions, 
including security sweeps, patrols, security guards, drug prevention and intervention 
programs, and community programs such as resident patrols (Gwaisda et al. 1997).   
  
A principle concern of the Chicago researchers was the development of methods 
that allowed safe, reliable data collection.  A telephone survey could not be used due to 
the high percentage of residents not having phones.  Poverty, illiteracy, and the fact that 
public housing authority records do not yield reliable mailing lists make a self-
administered mail survey problematic.  A face-to-face survey was preferable, but 
conducting interviews in residents’ homes created safety concerns.  The buildings could 
be filthy, elevators in the high-rise buildings might not work, lights may be out in 
hallways, and interviewers could be expected to encounter groups of young men outside 
and inside buildings who were gang members, drug users, or drug dealers (Gwaisda et al. 
1997). 
  
Gwaisda et al. (1997) used residents as interviewers, because they were familiar 
with the environment and were less afraid, respondents might be more willing to talk to 
other residents and provide more accurate responses, and the researchers would be 
providing employment to a population they were ultimately trying to help.   However, the 
resident interviewers required extensive training and supervision due to deficiencies in 
education and job experience.  Police and guards were on standby for assistance, yet they 
did not accompany the interviewers because the security staff was a source of respondent 
complaints (Gwaisda et al. 1997). 
  
A second significant problem encountered in Chicago was the identification of 
political structures that had to be notified of the research.  These included advisory 
councils within the developments, and CHA site managers and staff.  By using resident 
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interviewers and by working with CHA, the official barriers to site access were 
eliminated, yet resident leaders who had not be notified in advance of the first wave of 
surveys were uncooperative and suspicious toward survey staff.  This was alleviated in 
future waves by notifying CHA staff in writing and circulating a quarterly (Gwaisda et al. 
1997). 
 
Available resources (particularly time) did not permit me to conduct any form of 
survey.  As a possible middle ground, I originally intended to conduct brief interviews 
with key policy makers and implementers, as well as resident leaders in the KCDC study 
sites.  The KCDC staff and the KPD officers involved in the policy changes seemed to be 
willing to be interviewed; however, my attempts to contact willing resident leaders in the 
public housing sites were unsuccessful.   
 
I also discovered that using socio-economic or demographic variables to compare 
KCDC to the rest of Knoxville was problematic.  Trying to compare census variables for 
the two populations (e.g., comparing mean differences) was not possible for the same 
reason I could not generate total population data for KCDC in Chapter 3; the data was 
only available from KCDC for 1999 and 2000.   
 
Consequently, I decided to replace the interviews with multivariate regression 
analyses utilizing census data already in my possession.  I will conduct a separate 
regression analysis for each year (1996-2001) to determine a parsimonious model of area-
characteristic and policy variables that affect the crime rate in Knoxville.  The dependent 
variable will be the total Part I crimes divided by total population (or Knoxville’s Part I 
crime rate).  The unit of analysis will be an individual census tract. 
 
Tract Selection and the Regression Variables 
 
Even though useful socio-economic and demographic data were unavailable for 
the KCDC study sites alone, the Knoxville-Knox County Metropolitan Planning 
Commission (MPC) provided tract-level census data for 1990 and estimates for 199712, 
while the 2000 census data are available on the MPC website.  Due to the shortening of 
my timeframe, I decided to rely on the 1997 and 2000 census information to estimate data 
for all the remaining years between 1996 and 2001.  
 
Because the unit of analysis would be at the census tract level, it was first 
necessary to determine which tracts to use.  I began the tract-elimination process by first 
eliminating the tracts that are clearly outside the perimeter of the Knoxville city limits. 
Next, I ensured that census data are available for 1997 and 2000 (which allows estimation 
of missing census variables), and the tracts are geographically contiguous (for visual 
continuity).  The final product is 50 tracts.  Because crime incidents occurred in the 33 
tracts that I did not use for the regression analysis, these incidents were lost.  Table 6 
                                                 
12 The 1997 source data was provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, and 
was later compiled by the Knoxville-Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission in 1998.   
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below indicates the scale of the lost data, due to the timeframe shift and the eliminated 
tracts.   Despite the large number of incidents not used in the regression analyses, I am 
still able to utilize 49,408 incidents, or an average of 8235 incidents per year for my 
shorter timeframe.   
 
To calculate the dependent variable, I had to determine how many crime incidents 
occurred within each of the remaining tracts each year.  This was accomplished by using 
the Arcview software in a manner similar to the process used to create Figure 3, except I 
used it to determine the incidents each year that intersected each census tract.   Once I 
knew the number of incidents per tract each year, I could divide them by the population 
in each tract to determine the crime rate.   
 
The independent variables and my rationales for selecting them follow. 
 
• proportion of total population that is male (males/total population) – None of the 
area-characteristic literature studied whether gender was a factor.  Throughout the 
Criminology, Sociology, and Psychology literature regarding individual-level 
characteristics and their relationships to crime, males are universally believed to 
be more violent than women.  
  
• proportion of total population over 60 (sum of categories ages 60 to 85 and older/ 
total population) -- Felson and Cohen (1980) and Cohen et al. (1981) considered 
elderly residents as potential targets. 
 
• proportion of total population under 18 (sum categories under 5 years to 18 
divided by total population) -- Shaw and McKay (1942) and Brantingham and 
Jeffery (1981) were concerned with youthful offenders. 
 
• proportion of total population that is not caucasian (sum of categories Black, 
Amer. Indian, Alaskan Native, Asian, Nat. Hawaiian/Other Pac. Islander, 
Hispanic, and Other divided by total population) – Race and its relationship to 
crime was a factor in many studies, including Park and Burgess (1925), 
Brantingham and Brantingham (1975), Pettiway (1982), Hirsch (1983), Sampson 
and Wilson (1998), and McNulty and Holloway (2000). 
 
Table 6. 
Difference Between Incident Totals in Descriptive Analyses 
and Incident Totals Used in Regression Analyses 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Total 
Incidents 15232 13372 13257 13658 10750 11162 10162 9489 9459 10254 116795
Used in 
Regression 0 0 0 0 8499 8804 8096 7755 7774 8480 49408
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• proportion of total population w/ less than a high school education (population 
25 years and over; sum of categories Less than 9th grade and 9th to 12th w/ no 
diploma divided by total population) – Proponents of the comprehensive crime 
control measures (e.g., Podolefsky (1983)) argue that crime is a product of 
inadequate educational opportunities.  Sampson and Wilson (1998) believe poor-
quality schools in inner cities may lead to more crime. 
 
• proportion of total population unemployed (in civilian labor force, population 16 
years and over divided by total population) – Sampson and Wilson (1998) argue 
that inner city residents’ inability to find jobs contributes to the social 
disorganization and cultural isolation that creates conditions conducive to crime. 
 
• proportion of total households earning less than $10,000 (households earning 
less than $10,000 divided by total households) – If positively related to crime, this 
variable could indicate that individuals who are economically disadvantaged are 
the cause (i.e., Shaw and McKay 1942 and Sampson and Wilson 1988).  
However, Ehrlich (1973), Fabrikant (1979), Hakim (1980), Harries (1980), and 
Deutsch et al. (1987) write that offenders would seek to minimize their costs by 
committing property crimes in affluent areas, while Felson and Cohen (1980) and 
Cohen et al. (1981) believe wealthy people and property are attractive targets. 
 
• proportion of total households that are renter-occupied housing units (total 
renter-occupied housing units divided by total households) – Implicit in the 
HOPE VI grant from HUD is a belief that residents in owner-occupied housing 
units will be better motivated to maintain and protect their property as compared 
to renters.  Shaw and McKay (1942) include residential mobility among the four 
structural characteristics of the community that increase crime by eroding 
community social organization.   
 
• crime control policy implemented (coded: 1=received policy, 0=did not receive 
policy) – This is my policy dummy variable to differentiate between census tracts 
receiving policies (i.e. contained a KCDC study site) from those which did not.  
Because I am using a cross-sectional design, each implemented policy was coded 
in the same manner for the single year that I anticipated to see policy effects.  
Potential cumulative effects of the policies will be discussed in Chapter IV.   
 
• proportion of total households in the tract that is public housing (estimated 
number of occupied KCDC households divided by total households13) -- Waller 
                                                 
13  I had already calculated the yearly average of total occupied KCDC units in each study site for the 
calculations for Table 5 (see Footnote 8).  A problem arose when I discovered that Montgomery Village 
and Christenberry Heights both straddled two different pairs of adjacent census tracts.  Using the Arcview 
software, I placed the KCDC perimeter map theme and the building footprint theme over the census tract 
theme.  This allowed me to manually count the total number of buildings in the two study sites and the 
number of buildings that fell within each of the four census tracts.  Next, I divided the total number of units 
for both sites by the total buildings in each site to calculate the average number of units per building.  
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and Okihiro (1978) and McNulty and Holloway (2000) found relationships 
between crime and the mere presence of public housing.   Because the policy 
dummy variable applied to an entire census tract, I wanted to include a measure of 
the level of public housing within a tract affected by the new public policies.   I 
hoped this variable would reveal whether census tracts containing public housing 
were affecting the citywide crime rate differently than other census tracts.  This 
variable should allow more variance than the policy dummy. 
 
Estimation Method For Missing Data 
 
 Beginning with the 1997 and 2000 census data for the above variables (excluding 
the policy dummy variable) for each census tract, I calculated the difference between 
1997 and 2000 for each tract, and then divided the difference by three years to determine 
the yearly change for 1998, 1999, and 2001.  A reverse calculation was completed to 
account for 1996.  A sample calculation for three census tracts to estimate the proportion 
of total households that are renter-occupied is shown in Table 7. 
 
Regression Procedure 
 
   SPSS was used to perform the cross-sectional regression analysis for each year.  I 
began by conducting stepwise linear regressions utilizing all of the independent variables.  
Any variable that was statistically significant at a minimum .05 level was noted for each 
year.  All of the variables that were statistically significant during any year for the  
stepwise regressions were then analyzed with SPSS to ensure a correlation between each  
 
 
Table 7. 
Example of Calculation for Missing Data 
 
Calculation Definition 
Rentdif difference between the 2000 and 1997 data 
rentdif/3 difference divided by 3 (years) 
Reverse96 the reverse of the rentdif/3 column to account for the year preceding 1997 
 
Tract # 97rent 00rent rentdif rentdif/3 reverse9696rent 98rent 99rent 00rent 01rent
1 619 694.00 75 25 -25 594 644 669 694 719
2 388 428.00 40 13 -13 375 401 415 428 441
3 666 711.00 45 15 -15 651 681 696 711 726
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Finally, I used the number of units per building and the building counts for each tract to estimate the total 
units that fell within each tract.   College Homes fell completely within the boundaries of census tract 
number 12.  Because College Homes was demolished in December 1998, yet the residents were relocated 
earlier in the year, the proportion of total households that was public housing for all years after 1997 in 
census tract number 12 is calculated as zero.     
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Table 8. 
Correlations between Crime per Population and Independent Variables,  
1996-2001 (N = 50 [census tracts]) 
        
Variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Proportion of housing -0.019 -0.071 -0.008 -0.018 0.092 0.520Pearson R 
that is public housing 0.897 0.627 0.995 0.902 0.524 0.000Sig. (2-tailed) 
Proportion male 0.272 0.273 0.417 0.507 0.411 0.230 
  0.056 0.055 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.108 
Proportion over  0.191 0.124 0.039 -0.069 -0.182 -0.291 
age 60 0.184 0.392 0.786 0.632 0.205 0.041 
Proportion under  -0.078 -0.100 -0.177 -0.314 -0.267 0.052 
age 18 0.588 0.491 0.219 0.026 0.061 0.719 
Proportion of  0.171 0.172 0.176 0.215 0.275 0.322 
non-caucasions 0.235 0.232 0.223 0.134 0.053 0.022 
Proportion w/ less than 0.485 0.526 0.591 0.534 0.549 0.567 
high school education 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Proportion  0.506 0.448 0.585 0.491 0.411 0.656 
unemployed 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Proportion of 
households 0.395 0.396 0.425 0.499 0.551 0.489 
renter-occuppied 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
 
of the remaining independent variables and the dependent variable (total Part I crimes 
divided by population) for each year.  The results are in Table 8 above.   Because all the 
remaining independent variables were correlated with the dependent variable in at least 
one year, all the independent variables were used again to conduct listwise linear 
regressions for each year.   
 
Summary of Data and Methods 
 
 As the reader can see, the biggest problem I faced during this study was the same 
problem faced by other researchers interested in crime in public housing: data 
availability.  Fortunately, the staffs of KPD, KCDC, and the Metropolitan Planning 
Commission were tremendously helpful, not only in providing data sources, but also 
providing tutelage in the manipulation of them.  The Arcview mapping software allowed 
me to separate the incidents of crime in public housing from the incidents occurring in 
the rest of the Knoxville, which allowed me to create descriptive statistics for the two 
populations.  Although I could not generate statistics using a crime rate (or crimes per 
population) due to inadequate data for KCDC’s population, it was possible to estimate a 
crime occurrence rate (crimes per household).   
 
 Despite the agency assistance and the plethora of crime data, the pre-1996 
methodological problem necessitated that I reduce the timeframe for any analysis beyond 
simple descriptive statistics.  I was forced to use a cross-sectional design regression 
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analysis to search for other variables that might be influencing Knoxville’s total crime 
rate for two reasons.  First, census-type data for KCDC alone was unavailable (except 
near the end of my original 1992-2001 timeframe).  Second, a survey was not a feasible 
alternative due to the inherent problems of surveys in public housing, disinterest on the 
part of local housing resident leaders, and a lack of resources.    
 
Chapter IV will begin with some assumptions and limitations of the descriptive 
statistics, to be followed by an exploration of the descriptive findings.  Next, there will be 
a discussion of the limitations of the regression analyses, and the results of the listwise 
regression for each year.  Chapter IV will conclude with a discussion of caveats for the 
findings that must be acknowledged.   
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
 
An Assumption and Limitations of Descriptive Statistics for 1992-2001 
  
 As I have already discussed in Chapter III, there is a serious methodological 
problem with the KPD crime incident data prior to 1996.  Nevertheless, if simple assaults 
were incorrectly counted as aggravated assaults, the data entry error was systematically 
done for all simple assaults citywide.  Although this problem forces me to restrict my 
regression analyses to 1996-2001, I can still use my original 1992-2001 timeframe for 
comparisons of crime occurrence rates between the separate KCDC and remaining city 
populations, if I assume that simple assaults are randomly distributed between the two 
populations.   Figure 7 supports this assumption, which is a combination of the total 
crime occurrence rates from Figures 5 and 6.  Both the KCDC study sites and the rest of 
the city experienced similar overall crime occurrence rate patterns, prior to and including 
the 1995-’96 reduction.  For discussion purposes, the portion of Knoxville outside public 
housing will be referred to as the “City”, while references to the area inside public 
housing will be referred to as “KCDC”.    
 
Completely analyzing the descriptive statistics for each type of crime is not 
entirely useful, given the small number of incidents per year for two types of crime.  
Table 5 reveals that murders and rapes in both KCDC and the City are rare occurrences 
when compared to the other types of Part I violent crime.  Both murder and rape tend to  
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Figure 7.  Comparison of Total Crime Occurrence Rates for KCDC and City (KCDC 
exclusive) 
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fluctuate independently of the other crime variables, sometimes varying dramatically 
from year to year (e.g., up 400% in KCDC in 2000), given the small number of incidents.  
However, occurrence rates of rape and murder are consistently higher in KCDC than in 
the City.  Murder rates range from .0005 to .0041 in KCDC, and rape ranges from .0023 
to .0061.  City murder rates range from .0002 to .0004, and rape ranges from .0008 to 
.0016.   
 
 Comparing descriptive statistics from one year to another assumes that the effects 
of the individual policies occurred at discrete points in time, and are observable in terms 
of impact upon incidents of Part I crime.  This assumption does not account for the 
compounding effects of multiple policy implementations upon the crime rate over time.  
In other words, the independent effects of any single policy may be indistinguishable 
from crime rate changes caused by preceding policies.   
 
Descriptive Findings 
 
The combination of privatization of city streets in 1992 and the assignment of one 
Security Patrol officer to each site in 1993 was intended to reduce crime in several ways.  
First, privatization of the streets meant that the Security Patrol could treat the study sites 
as private property.  This permitted the Security Patrol to stop and identify any individual 
on the premises, because all residents were issued identification cards by KCDC.  Due to 
street privatization, the Security Patrol could place non-residents on a No Trespass List, 
which permitted the Security Patrol to physically remove anyone who should not be on 
the property.  Second, the installation of a regular police presence was intended to place 
constant pressure upon those wanting to sell or buy drugs, engage in prostitution, or 
anyone wanting to commit a crime of opportunity.   
  
The privatization of streets in October 1992 and the assignment of one Security 
Patrol officer to each site in February 1993 are too close in time to separate the impact of 
each policy.  Nevertheless, if the policies had a cumulative impact, one might find a 
greater decrease in the incidents of crime or the occurrence rates for 1993 in KCDC than 
for the City.  Table 4 indicates that total crime incidents decreased by a greater 
percentage in the City (- 12.6%) than in KCDC (- 5%).  The total crime occurrence rate 
from Table 5 for KCDC dropped from 0.3444 in 1992 to 0.3271 in 1993 (-.0173), while 
the total City rate dropped from 0.2030 in 1992 to 0.1757 in 1993 (-.0273).   In fact, auto 
thefts (+ .0018) and larcenies (+ .0032) rose slightly between the two years in KCDC, 
while the City had small decreases (auto theft -.004, larcenies -.0132).   Both KCDC and 
the City had reductions in burglaries (KCDC -.0181, City -.0071) and robberies (KCDC -
.0027, City -.0028), while aggravated assaults rose slightly for both populations (KCDC 
+ .0013, City +.0002).  If there was a delayed effect for the two policies, it may appear in 
1994.  Table 4 shows that KCDC experienced a total 7.9% crime incident increase in 
1994, while the City experienced a 1.4% decrease.   
 
In order to gauge whether crime that was occurring in KCDC was being affected 
by the policies relative to total citywide crime, one can look at the calculation at the 
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bottom of Table 3, which shows the proportion of total citywide crime represented by 
KCDC each year.  Between 1992 and 1994, the KCDC proportion of total citywide crime 
rose from .0498 to .0587.    
 
In 1993, when the two policies may have a cumulative effect, the City saw a 
bigger reduction in overall crime incidents than KCDC.  With regards to occurrence rates 
for individual types of crime, the two populations had similar results for burglaries, 
robberies, and aggravated assaults, yet KCDC saw increases for auto thefts and larcenies 
when the City saw small reductions.   There does not appear to be a delayed impact in 
1994, and the proportion of total citywide crime occurring in KCDC seems to be rising 
between 1992 and 1994.  Given the trends for the two populations, the two policies do 
not seem to be effective. 
 
The descriptive statistics reveal that KCDC experienced a greater reduction in 
crime incidents during 1995-1996 than the City, and a tremendous drop in aggravated 
assaults dominated the greater overall KCDC occurrence rate reduction.  KCDC 
experienced a crime reduction of 41.3%, as compared to a City reduction of 19.9%.  The 
proportion of total citywide crime represented by KCDC in Table 3 dropped from .0652 
to .0487, which was the largest drop between years during the 1992-2001 timeframe.   
 
Prior to the 1995-1996 reductions, the rates of occurrence for aggravated assault, 
auto theft, burglary, and robbery rose noticeably between 1994 and 1995 in KCDC 
(average increase = .01238), while occurrence rates for the same crimes rose to a much 
smaller extent in the remaining City during 1995 (average increase = .0009).  The total 
occurrence rate for KCDC dropped from .4043 in 1995, to .2373 in 1996, and .2210 in 
1997.  During the same period, the City rate began at .1740, dropped to .1381 in 1996, 
yet rose to .1428 in 1997.  
 
If one ignores aggravated assaults (due to the methodological problem), and 
murder and rape (due to their high variance) in Table 4, one can see that KCDC saw 
double-digit percentage reductions between 1995 and 1996 in every other Part I crime 
category, dropping significantly more than the City in terms of auto thefts, burglaries, and 
larcenies.   The biggest one-year occurrence rate reductions in Table 5 were between 
1995 and 1996 in KCDC, with aggravated assaults (- .1334), auto thefts (- .014), 
burglaries (- .0173), and larceny (- .0177).  Comparatively, City aggravated assaults fell 
.0171, auto thefts dropped .0022, burglary fell .0062, and larceny dropped .0083.  
Robbery dropped similarly for both populations during 1996.    
 
Assuming again that the incorrectly included simple assaults were randomly 
distributed between the two populations, one could conclude that KCDC did experience a 
greater overall crime reduction in 1995-1996.  The assumption is supported by the fact 
that aggravated assaults were the crime type that comprised the biggest proportion of the 
1995-1996 crime occurrence rate reduction for both KCDC and the City.   Unfortunately, 
explaining findings for 1995-1996 remains problematic due to the pre-1996 data entry 
errors and confounding events. 
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I tried to gauge the potential effects of the confounding events that occurred 
between 1995 and 1997.  The highest level of funding for the Security Patrol occurred in 
1995 and 1996 (see Table 1), which indicates either more officers were present at any one 
time, the officers at each site worked more hours, or a combination of both.   
 
I inquired about the deployment level of officers during the information gathering 
stage of this research, but the data existed only in the form of personnel timecards.  Time 
did not permit me to dig through the cards for hundreds of officers for ten years, 
assuming KPD would be willing to give me access.  According to the 1996 – 1998 
PHDEP applications, 1995-1997 was the period in which KPD’s enforcement efforts 
were supplemented by the FBI and Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, resulting in the 
arrests of several leaders of the Florida-based drug trafficking ring based in part in the 
KCDC sites.  Given the influence of the external actors and lack of data, it is unknown 
how much the external agencies affected crime in KCDC.  
 
On the one hand, it is impossible to separate the effects of the coinciding 1996 
One-Strike policy, the increased law enforcement presence by external agencies in 
KCDC between 1995 and early 1997, and the highest level of grant funding which 
occurred during 1996.  On the other hand, if One-Strike policy had a separate effect from 
other events, the effect may remain during 1997, because the policy was implemented 
during September 1996 near the end of the external agencies’ involvement.  The policy 
was intended to reduce the number of problem tenants by simply evicting them from their 
residences within the study sites.   
 
During 1997, KCDC saw a 6.9% decrease in total crime incidents, and small total 
occurrence rate reduction (-.0163).   There was a coinciding 4.4% increase in the City’s 
total crime incidents and an overall occurrence rate increase (+.0047).  Burglary (-.0068), 
auto theft (-.0023), and robbery (-.0099) did see minimal reductions in KCDC occurrence 
rates between 1996 and 1997, which could suggest an impact upon crimes of opportunity.  
KCDC aggravated assault (+.0018) and larceny (+.0023) increased during 1997 in 
KCDC.  For the City, burglary (-.0041), auto theft (-.001), and robbery (-.0004) fell less 
than KCDC, aggravated assaults remained virtually unchanged (-.0001) and larceny rose 
(+.0099).  The proportion of total citywide crime in KCDC fell from .0487 in 1996 to 
.0436 in 1997. 
 
There are differing crime trends for the two populations in 1997.  KCDC 
experienced overall reductions in the number of crime incidents, its proportion of total 
citywide crime, and a decrease in overall occurrence rates, while opposite trends occurred 
for the City.  Occurrence rates for burglary, auto theft, and robbery fell at a higher level 
in KCDC than in the City, and the City larceny rate rose more than four times as much as 
KCDC larceny.  Although the City aggravated assault rate remained virtually unchanged, 
KCDC experienced a small increase.  These findings suggest that the One-Strike policy 
was effective upon crimes of opportunity and property crimes, yet did not reduce 
aggravated assaults.  However, to make this conclusion, one must assume that 
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confounding variables (i.e., the external actors) are not causing the 1997 reductions in 
KCDC crime as compared to the City.    
 
Because one entire study site was removed with the demolition of College Homes 
in 1998, one might intuitively anticipate a related reduction in crime.  Demolition began 
on College Homes in December 1998, yet the policy impact should be in 1998 because 
KCDC began relocating residents as early as late 1997 (White 2002).   If the number of 
Part I crime incidents occurring in College Homes was small, then the removal of the 
College Homes households could potentially cause the KCDC occurrence rates to rise 
slightly. 
 
Table 3 shows a continuation of the downward trend in the proportion of total 
citywide crime in KCDC that began in 1996, with the proportion falling to .0428 in 1998.  
Table 4 reveals that KCDC saw a total incident reduction of 10.7%, while the City 
experienced an 8.9% reduction.  KCDC saw bigger reductions in aggravated assaults  
(-15.9%) and larcenies (-13.9%) than the City (aggravated assault + 0.3%; larceny –
5.2%), but the City had a 2.1% reduction in robbery while KCDC had a 20.7% increase.  
The City saw a much larger reduction (-17.3%) in auto thefts, while KCDC was 
unchanged, and the City had a slightly larger reduction (by 1.1%) in burglaries than 
KCDC.         
 
Table 5 demonstrates that the City experienced overall crime occurrence rate 
reduction in 1998, and either small reduction or stability in the occurrence rates for the 
different crime types, but KCDC saw opposite findings.  The total crime occurrence rate 
for KCDC increased .0012 as compared to a small reduction (-.0139) for the City 
between 1997 and 1998.  Auto thefts (+.0033), and robberies (+.0047) increased in 
KCDC to small degrees, while the rates for the same crimes fell slightly in the City (auto 
theft -.0036; robbery -.0002).  Aggravated assaults fell in KCDC (-.0032), while the City 
remained unchanged.  Burglary and larceny decreased similarly in both populations 
during the same term.   
 
Drawing conclusions about the removal of College Homes is problematic.  Table 
3 shows a downward trend in the proportion of total citywide crime, but the reduction in 
1998 could be due to the removal of College Homes, or it could be due to a trend begun 
by previous policies.  Table 4 shows that KCDC saw larger reductions in aggravated 
assaults and larcenies than the City, but the City saw bigger reductions in the other crime 
categories than KCDC.  Table 5 indicates that the City had slightly larger occurrence rate 
reductions or stability in every category, while KCDC saw small increases or similar 
reductions.  Tables 4 and 5 agree that KCDC seemed to experience greater reductions in 
aggravated assaults between 1997 and 1998, but the two tables disagree in terms of which 
population experienced less total crime.   
 
In terms of crimes per households (Table 5), the demolition of College Homes 
appears to be ineffective upon total crime, but it must be noted that the differences 
between the occurrence rates for 1997 and 1998 for the two populations are very small.   
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All of the findings suggest that the policy may have a marginal impact upon aggravated 
assaults in KCDC.   
 
The implementation of the team-based approach in March 1999 was probably 
early enough in the year to have an impact on the 1999 crime levels.  Table 3 shows a 
reversal in the proportion of total citywide crime in KCDC in 1999, which increased to 
.0441.  According to Table 4, incidents of crime dropped 10.7% in 1998 in KCDC, yet 
fell only 3.9% in 1999.  Taken together, Table 3 and 4 are inconsistent with a negative 
impact of the policy upon overall crime.  In addition, the City experienced an 8.9% 
reduction in 1998, and a larger 6.7% reduction in 1999.  Crime occurrence rates fell 
slightly overall between 1998 and 1999 (KCDC -.0087, City -.0098).  When one 
examines the occurrence rates for the different types of crimes, a different pattern 
emerges for the two populations.  The occurrence rates for burglary (-.0026), larceny  
(-.0072), and robbery (-.0036) fell between 1998 and 1999 for KCDC, yet aggravated 
assaults (+.0071) rose in 1999 and auto thefts remained unchanged.  City aggravated 
assaults (-.0015) fell in 1999, burglary (-.0035) and larceny (-.006) rates were reduced at 
similar levels to KCDC, and City robbery (+.0004) and auto theft (+.001) slightly 
increased.    
 
The City had a greater reduction in the total crime incidents and the total crime 
occurrence rate than KCDC in 1999.  However, burglary, larceny, and auto thefts fell 
similarly for the two populations, with KCDC seeing occurrence rate reductions for 
property crimes that were slightly larger than City rate reductions.  In addition, the two 
populations exhibited different patterns for occurrence rates for crimes against persons, 
with City robbery increasing and aggravated assaults falling, while KCDC robbery fell 
and aggravated assaults rose.   
 
The 1999 team-based approach to policing was intended to create a group of 
Security Patrol officers at each KCDC site who worked well together and who could 
develop a sense of trust with the residents by getting to know them.  If the officers 
became familiar with individual residents, then this could explain the reductions in 
KCDC property crimes and crimes of opportunity, but it appears as though the new 
policy was ineffectual against the larger problem of aggravated assault.    
 
The implementation of new applicant screening procedures occurred in 
September 2000, which may appear as a reduction in crime in 2001.  In Table 3, the 
proportion of total crime represented by KCDC dropped from a four-year high of .0472 
in 2000 to .0411 in 2001.  The 2001 KCDC proportion of total citywide crime was the 
lowest level reported for the 1992-2001 timeframe.  The total percent change in overall 
crime increased by 6.7% in KCDC in 2000, but was reduced by 5.6% in 2001 in Table 4.  
The City experienced a decrease of .6% in 2000 that was followed by an increase of 9.1% 
in 2001.  Occurrence rates in Table 5 for the two populations also include differences.  
During 2001, KCDC and the City saw decreases in rates for auto theft (KCDC -.0127, 
City -.0021) and larceny (KCDC -.0082, City -.0041), yet KCDC’s decreases were 
noticeably larger.  Both had increases in aggravated assault (KCDC +.0132, City +.005).  
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While the City’s burglary (+.0076) and robbery (+.0024) rates increased in 2001, 
KCDC’s rates for burglary (-.0051) and robbery (-.0005) decreased.   
 
 All of the indicators for crimes of opportunity decreased in KCDC during 2001, 
while the City’s occurrence rates for the same crimes either decreased less, or the City’s 
occurrence rates increased.  Aggravated assault increased for both, with KCDC 
experiencing a greater increase.  In terms of property crimes, the new policy for screening 
applicants seems to be effective. 
 
Despite all the time, energy, and money spent on the Security Patrol, Figures 5 
and 6 also demonstrate that KCDC is a more dangerous place to live than the rest of 
Knoxville.  In Figure 6, only larceny (.0676) remains above the .05 occurrence rate in the 
City.  Figure 5 shows that aggravated assault (.0587) and larceny (.0613) remain 
problems for KCDC.  Burglary in KCDC has continued to fluctuate around the .05 level 
since 1996, dropping slightly to .0455 in 2001.   
 
Assumptions and Limitations of the Regression Analyses 
 
Two independent variables were not statistically significant at a minimum alpha 
of .05 for the stepwise linear regressions for each year, resulting in their elimination from 
the subsequent listwise regressions.  The policy dummy variable was one, providing 
some evidence that the policies were not having a significant independent impact upon 
the crime rate in Knoxville.  Nevertheless, concluding that the policies had no 
independent effects requires one to accept some assumptions and to acknowledge some 
limitations of the research design.    
 
Like the descriptive statistics, the cross-sectional design for the regression 
analyses, including the coding scheme for the dummy variable, assumes that a maximum 
of one policy was affecting the crime rate in Knoxville each year.   My method of coding 
the policy dummy variable was to assign a "1" to an entire census tract (in the year an 
individual policy was expected to cause an effect in the citywide crime rate) if a policy 
was implemented in a KCDC study site falling within the boundaries of the individual 
tract.  Because two study sites straddled the boundaries of two tracts each, it was 
necessary to assign a "1" to 9 out of 50 census tracts during 1996 and 1997 (there are 7 
KCDC study sites).  The number of tracts affected by policies was reduced to 8 out of 50 
for 1998-2001, due to the demolition of College Homes.     
 
The lack of variance within a single year between tracts for the policy dummy 
variable could explain its lack of statistical significance in the stepwise regressions.  If 
more cases were available, they might show that the policies have an independent effect.   
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The assumptions of the policy dummy coding method and the lack of variance created by 
it were the reasons behind my desire to include another independent variable that took 
into account the level of public housing within each tract. (See Footnote 10 in Chapter 3.)    
 
Regression Findings 
 
  Another look at Figures 5, 6, and 7 demonstrates two things: 1) need for the 
timeframe change due to the obvious drop during 1995-1996, and 2) KCDC has 
consistently more total crime than the rest of Knoxville.  Figure 7 and the elimination of 
the policy variable led to a fundamental question: if the policies don’t seem to be 
affecting overall crime, what factors are influencing it?  The yearly listwise regression 
analyses are intended to provide additional answers. 
 
 The second variable eliminated due to a lack of significance in the stepwise 
regressions was the proportion of households earning less than $10,000.   This was my 
only measure of poverty, and its elimination coincides with the belief of multiple authors 
that offenders choose affluent targets (i.e., Ehrlich 1973; Fabrikant 1979; Hakim 1980; 
Harries 1980; Deutsch et al. 1987).  This finding also contradicts the arguments of Shaw 
and McKay (1942) and Sampson and Wilson (1998) who believe that areas characterized 
by poverty are more likely to experience more crime.   
 
 Because all the remaining variables were correlated to the citywide crime rate (in 
Table 8), they were combined into a single listwise regression model for each year.  The 
results for the cross-sectional listwise regressions are contained in Table 9.  The Adjusted 
R2 for each year ranges from 0.517 in 1997 to 0.708 in 2001.  Two variables stand out 
from the rest: the proportion male and the proportion of the population (over age 25) with 
less than a high school education.  The proportion male was significant at the .01 level 
every year 1996-1999.  The proportion with less than a high school education was 
statistically significant at the .01 level for 1999-2001, and was significant at the .05 level 
for 1998.   
 
The variable included to gauge the degree to which total housing in each tract was 
public housing was significant at the .05 level for 1996, 1997, and 2001.  Like the policy 
dummy variable, the proportion of public housing in each tract should remain fairly 
constant from year to year, except for the complete removal of public housing from one 
tract that was caused by the demolition of College Homes.  Nevertheless, the proportion 
of total housing that is public housing was significant during the stepwise analysis, was 
correlated with the dependent variable (the citywide crime rate) for 2001 in Table 8, and 
was statistically significant at the .05 level for 2001 in the multivariate regression 
findings of Table 9.  Taken together, these findings suggest that tracts with a higher 
proportion of public housing are positively affecting the crime rate, when controlling for 
other variables, during 2001.   Unfortunately, it is difficult to reconcile the positive effect 
of the variable in 2001 with the statistically significant (at .05) negative impact it had 
upon the citywide crime rate in 1996 and 1997.   
 
  
 
61
Table 9. 
Listwise Regression Analysis Results  
By Year (N = 50 [census tracts]) 
     
Variable 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Proportion of housing -0.291 -0.342 -0.146 0.028 0.122 0.350   Beta 
that is public housing -2.393 -2.239 -1.101 0.229 0.869 2.210   t statistic 
  0.021 0.031 0.277 0.820 0.390 0.040   Significance
Proportion male 0.475 0.374 0.430 0.500 0.312 0.172 
 3.720 2.469 2.991 3.020 1.520 0.958 
  0.001 0.018 0.005 0.004 0.136 0.343 
Proportion over  0.611 0.463 0.330 0.189 0.106 0.049 
age 60 3.797 2.370 1.895 1.131 0.579 0.333 
  0.000 0.023 0.065 0.265 0.566 0.741 
Proportion under  0.437 0.367 0.122 -0.142 -0.211 -0.273 
age 18 2.258 1.452 0.543 -0.653 -0.832 -1.175 
  0.029 0.154 0.590 0.517 0.410 0.247 
Proportion of  -0.090 -0.055 -0.052 0.265 0.261 0.174 
non-Caucasians -0.827 -0.378 -0.362 2.073 1.955 1.613 
  0.413 0.707 0.719 0.044 0.057 0.115 
Proportion w/ less than 0.086 0.194 0.369 0.510 0.489 0.404 
high school education 0.567 1.015 2.236 4.063 4.270 4.523 
  0.574 0.316 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Proportion  0.421 0.277 0.331 -0.073 -0.066 0.304 
unemployed 3.971 1.748 1.790 -0.444 -0.397 1.688 
  0.000 0.088 0.081 0.659 0.693 0.099 
Proportion of households 0.611 0.586 0.315 0.291 0.320 0.158 
renter-occupied 4.265 3.034 1.793 1.630 1.620 0.975 
  0.000 0.004 0.080 0.111 0.113 0.336 
Adjusted R2 0.639 0.517 0.651 0.668 0.601 0.708 
F test 11.855 7.559 12.413 13.343 10.218 15.825 
Total Crime Incidents 8499 8804 8096 7755 7774 8480 
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The proportion of households that are renter-occupied is significant at the .01 
level for 1996 and 1997.  The proportion over age 60 is also significant for the same two 
years, with significance at the .01 level in 1996, and .05 in 1997.   
 
Three variables were significant only during one year.  In 1996, the proportion 
under age 18 was significant at .05, and proportion unemployed was significant at .01.  
The proportion of non-Caucasians, which was intended to gauge the importance of race, 
was significant at the .05 level in 1999. 
 
The findings in Table 9 are interesting for three reasons.   First, Table 9 shows 
that the crime rate in Knoxville is consistently the result of the proportion of males (over 
age 25), who have less than a high school education.  This finding makes intuitive sense, 
and it coincides with the findings of Sampson and Wilson (1998) who argue that crime is 
linked to substandard educational opportunities in inner cities.   
 
Second, Table 9 is interesting because of variables that do not appear to be 
consistent causal factors for crime in Knoxville.  Despite all the literature regarding race 
and crime, the linkage between unemployment or lack of jobs and crime, and the 
problems caused by youthful offenders, my variables representing race, unemployment, 
and juveniles were not significant more than one year.  Similarly, the variables 
representing potential targets (proportion over age 60) and residential mobility 
(proportion of renter-occupied housing) were significant only during 1996 and 1997. 
 
 Third, the two years that contain the most significant variables are 1996 and 1997, 
with 1996 having six and 1997 having four.  The proportion of public housing is included 
in the significant variables for these two years, in addition to 2001.  Given that all the 
variables in the regression analyses are indicators of characteristics common to criminals,  
are indicators of potential targets, or represent the presence of public housing or mobile 
residents, something seems to be happening in 1996 and 1997 to cause all of these 
variables to become significant at the same time.   
 
The same two years also coincide with the enforcement efforts of external federal 
law enforcement agencies in the mid 1990s.  From the perspective of hindsight, it is 
possible that the presence of federal law enforcement and the highest level of spending 
for the Security Patrol (see Table 1) occurred at exactly the right time to reduce crime.  
Multiple variables that one would expect to have a positive effect upon the citywide 
crime rate became significant at the same time, which could be a reflection of aggressive 
law enforcement tactics that resulted in more arrests.  More arrests would result in more 
reported incidents of Part I crime and a higher citywide crime rate.   
 
If aggressive enforcement caused multiple indicators of crime to become 
significant in 1996 and 1997, then explaining the negative relationship between the 
proportion of housing that was public housing and the crime rate for 1996 and 1997 
remains problematic.   As already noted in the descriptive findings, separating the 
combined effects of the 1996 One-Strike policy, external agency involvement, and the 
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highest level of funding for the Security Patrol is not possible.  Although the policy 
variable was eliminated in the stepwise regression analysis, multiple crime control 
measures were applied to public housing in 1996 and 1997 by the Security Patrol and 
external agencies.  Because public housing alone was the focus of these enforcement 
efforts, it might explain a positive relationship between the proportion of public housing 
and the crime rate citywide, but it doesn’t explain a negative relationship.   
 
Summary of Findings 
 
Multiple assumptions were made when conducting the above analyses.  Due to 
the pre-1996 methodological problem, I had to assume that aggravated assaults were 
randomly distributed among the KCDC and City populations.  Both the descriptive 
findings and the regression findings assume that the effects of individual policies are 
discernible from the effects of policies implemented earlier in time.  This assumption was 
reflected in my coding scheme for the policy dummy variable, which may have resulted 
in its elimination from the listwise regression analyses.   
 
The descriptive statistics show that the privatization of Knoxville streets in 1992 
and the assignment of one Security Patrol officer to each site in 1993 do not seem to have 
an effect upon KCDC when compared to the City.  Although the 1996 One-Strike policy 
seems to have an effect upon crimes of opportunity and property crimes, the confounding 
events of the mid 1990s, including the actions of external agencies, make it difficult to 
find an independent impact of the 1996 policy.  There are also no clear conclusions that 
can be drawn from the removal of College Homes.  If demolishing College Homes had an 
effect, it was a marginal impact upon aggravated assaults at best, particularly when 
viewed in terms of the overall assumptions being made.  The 1999 team-based approach 
to policing seems to be effective against crimes of opportunity and property crimes, while 
the new applicant screening process of 2000 seems to reduce property crimes. 
 
The regression analyses indicate that two variables are the primary causal factors 
behind Knoxville’s crime rate: the proportion of males and the proportion (of those 25 
years old and older) with less than a high school education.  At minimum, these findings 
make intuitive sense.    
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Summary of Dissertation  
 
 Between the late 1980s and 2001, the Knoxville Community Development 
Corporation and the Knoxville Police Department created distinct policy or program 
changes intended to reduce crime in Knoxville’s public housing.   Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design (CPTED) was the dominant form of crime control during 
the 1980s.  Beginning with pilot programs that reduced thefts and vandalism of newly 
remodeled buildings in Walter P. Taylor Homes and Austin Homes in 1989, a 
cooperative relationship between KCDC and KPD was born, which later evolved into the 
creation of the KCDC Security Patrol in 1990.  The Security Patrol is comprised of off-
duty KPD officers who work for KCDC as its private security force under a contractual 
agreement between the two agencies.  Funding for the wages of the Security Patrol 
members and the use of KPD equipment comes from HUD’s Public Housing Drug 
Elimination Program.   
 
The software used by KPD to store its crime data prior to 1992 prevented any 
analysis of the effectiveness of the CPTED security measures.  By using Arcview 3.2 
software, I was able to separate the yearly violent crime incidents for 1992-2001 that 
occurred in two separate geographical regions: 1) the area represented by the perimeters 
of the KCDC housing sites that were the focus of this study, and 2) the remainder of the 
City of Knoxville that was not within the housing sites.   After generating descriptive 
statistics for the two separate populations, I was able to make comparisons between them 
to determine possible effects of six crime control policies that were implemented by the 
Security Patrol after 1991.   
 
   The policies under evaluation either have no negative effects upon the total 
level of crime occurrences (i.e., street privatization, assignment of one officer per site, 
and demolition of College Homes), or they have no effect upon the occurrence level of 
aggravated assaults in the KCDC sites.  The 1999 team-based approach and the new 
applicant screening process of 2000 seem to somewhat reduce crimes of opportunity 
and/or property crimes.  The 1996 One-Strike policy seems to have the same effect, but 
separating the effect of the policy from confounding variables is not possible.  The 
demolition of College Homes appears to have a marginal effect upon aggravated assaults.   
 
Because the policies under study do not appear to be greatly effective in reducing 
total crime in Knoxville’s public housing, and because a survey of Knoxville’s public 
housing residents was not possible, regression analyses in a cross-sectional design were 
used to gain further insight into the effects of other variables upon Knoxville’s crime rate.  
An individual census tract was the level of analysis.  Socio-economic and demographic 
indicators of crime were used, as well as a policy dummy variable and a variable 
representing the degree of public housing within each census tract.   A methodological 
problem at the data-collection phase within KPD prevented the use of data prior to 1996.   
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The listwise regressions indicate that crime in Knoxville is most closely 
associated with the proportion of males, and by those who are over the age of 25 who do 
not possess a high school education.    Despite strong support in the literature to the 
contrary, race, unemployment, the presence of juveniles, households with low income, 
potential targets of crime (as represented by the proportion over age 60), and a mobile 
population (as indicated by the proportion of renter-occupied households) did not appear 
to be predictors of crime in Knoxville, once other variables were included.  It could be 
that these variables have an impact upon crime, but they do not produce significant, 
explained variance when the other independent variables are in the model.  The 
proportion of housing that was public housing was statistically significant in 2001, but 
the negative direction of the relationship between it and the dependent variable in 1996 
and 1997 cannot be explained.   
 
 There are several caveats that must be placed on this entire study.  First, as noted 
in Footnote 4 of Chapter 1, the Part I crime incident data upon which this study is based 
still have an error rate (due to missing data) of 13%.  The high error rate is a product of 
using street addresses to assign geographical locations to the individual incidents of crime 
with the Arcview software.  Second, the descriptive statistics and regression analyses do 
not account for the compounding effects of multiple policies over time, or they do not 
account for possible diminishing returns of policies due to previous policies.  Third, it is 
conceivable that things might be worse in public housing if no policies were implemented 
to control crime between 1992 and 2001.  
 
The problem in Knoxville may be that there is little else KPD and KCDC can do 
to reduce crime in the KCDC sites.   Knoxville’s public housing contains a dense 
population of individuals with comparatively low incomes and educational attainment 
levels.  KCDC installed a constant police presence in the study sites for ten years by 
spending millions of dollars, and KPD used policing tactics that are not applicable to the 
general public.  Nevertheless, the combination of disadvantaged residents and the 
physical nature of public housing may simply create an environment conducive to crime 
that no amount of policy or programmatic change can alter.  When one considers that 
murders and rapes occur within KCDC at higher levels than the rest of the City, and 
aggravated assaults usually represent serious crimes against persons involving weapons, 
it is apparent that KCDC and KPD still have a dangerous environment in Knoxville’s 
public housing. 
 
Future Research 
 
The study by Popkin et al. (1999) in Chicago’s Housing Authority recommended 
that demolition of existing public housing sites might be the only solution to solving 
crime problems.  College Homes was demolished and other sites might ultimately follow 
in Knoxville if KCDC continues to receive HOPE VI funding.  The deciding factors may 
be whether crime rates rise in the new single-family-residential neighborhood that is 
being built on the College Homes site, or whether other sites are becoming too costly in 
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terms of facility maintenance and ongoing violent crime.  But before other public housing 
sites are demolished, I believe it is necessary to conduct additional research into the 
methods used to determine that College Homes was beyond help.  Specifically, I question 
the use of calls for service data (from the 911 system) to gather crime statistics for 
College Homes.   
 
The grant applications for the HOPE VI funding included statistics showing that 
College Homes had a much higher rate of calls for service than the rest of Knoxville 
(KCDC 1998c).  Although this may be true, my analyses of the Part I crime data 
demonstrate that College Homes only had a handful of violent crimes each year between 
1992 and demolition in 1998.  This discrepancy forces me to question the validity of 
using the calls for service data as the basis for establishing a crime problem.   
 
I intend to conduct a comparison of the Part I and calls for service data for 
Knoxville using the separate databases provided by the KPD.  At a minimum, I hope to 
reveal the pitfalls of the calls for service data.  I hypothesize that the high number of calls 
for service in College Homes was a product of having a dense population in a housing 
project typified by brick construction, narrow alleyways, and bad acoustics.  If an 
incident occurred in College Homes, every resident probably heard it as it happened.   
Comparing the timing of each call for service to the Part I data may prove interesting. 
 
The Chicago researchers also concluded that demolition might lead to negative 
externalities, as gangs are displaced to other neighborhoods (Popkin et al. 1999).  Several 
other researchers have noted a “diffusion of crime” to other areas in response to directed 
law enforcement efforts or new crime control programs (e.g., Press 1970; Mehay 1977; 
Fabrikant 1979).  The Arcview software would allow me to not only determine which 
crime incidents fall within the public housing sites, but also determine which incidents 
fall within a specified distance from the sites.  By using the software to count the 
incidents inside the KCDC sites and the incidents within a few blocks or several hundred 
feet of the site perimeters, I could trace the level of crime diffusion before and after 
policy implementation.  An example is shown in Figure 8 below. 
 
Another possible application of the Arcview software would involve the creation 
of maps showing the density of crime incidents per year, utilizing a software extension 
called Spatial Analyst.  Spatial Analyst allows the user to transform map layers showing 
crime incident pins into maps showing different gradations of color or texture that 
represent different density levels of the pins.  Once the graphical pins are transformed 
into crime “hot spots,” other variables representing census tract data or other 
geographical identifiers (e.g., streets, or the KCDC study site perimeters) can be laid over 
them.  For example, Figure 9 shows varying densities for crime incidents Citywide in 
1996.14   The darker (or more dense) areas coincide with Knoxville’s downtown, which is  
                                                 
14 An example showing the density with an overlay of census variables and other geographic identifiers was 
not possible, because the file formats for densities in Arcview do not produce readable maps in Microsoft 
Word on Windows XP.   
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Figure 8.  1997 Part I Crime Incidents Within 1500 ft of College Homes (shown in  
yellow) 
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Density of 1996 Part I Crime 
  
 
68
consistent with researchers who have found relationships between crime and city centers 
(i.e., Fabrikant 1979; Brantingham and Brantingham 1984).     
 
There are many different ways the Part I crime database alone or in combination 
with the Arcview software can be used for future research.  Due to the pre-1996 
methodological problem, any use of the database to study all seven types of Part I crime 
will require a reliance on the 1996-2001 timeframe.  However, if I want to study 
individual types of crime over time, exclusive of aggravated assaults (to avoid the pre-
1996 problem), I could do so utilizing the entire 1992-2001 timeframe.  For example, 
property crimes and crimes of opportunity (i.e., burglary, auto theft, larceny, and robbery) 
seem to be affected by some of the KPD/KCDC policies in this study.  The database 
contains information regarding the exact time of day, day of week, and month for each 
incident.  It might be interesting to study the temporal patterns of these types of crimes.  I 
could also recreate the cross-section design, except use the different types of crime as the 
dependent variable.   
 
 A time series analysis was not possible for this study, given the six years that 
were used in the cross-sectional design for my regression analyses, and given the amount 
of time available in which to defend the dissertation.  However, a time series design can 
be created by using the Part I data on a monthly basis and by using the 1990, 1997, and 
2000 census data already in my possession to estimate socio-economic and demographic 
variables by month.  Again due to the pre-1996 problem, I can generate 72 points in time 
(the months from 1996-2001) if aggravated assaults are included, or I can generate 120 
points in time (1992-2001) if aggravated assaults are excluded.   
 
It may be time for a change in law enforcement strategies toward crime in public 
housing in Knoxville.  Millions of dollars were spent, but Knoxville’s public housing 
remains a more hazardous place to live than the rest of Knoxville.  The PHDEP grants 
received by KCDC currently provide a comparatively small amount of funds for a variety 
of social services and educational programs in the KCDC sites.  If the regression findings 
are accurate, perhaps in the future KCDC will allocate a larger proportion of its federal 
funding to programs not involving law enforcement, but instead trying to educate its 
residents who are males over the age of twenty-five, who do not have a high-school 
education.   
 
As noted in Chapter II, some researchers and PHA staffs nationwide advocate a 
comprehensive approach to reducing crime in public housing that includes tenant 
participation, drug prevention programs, and education programs.   For over a decade, the 
KCDC Security Patrol used policing strategies that the average U.S. citizen might 
consider harsh yet necessary, but these tactics would obviously be unconstitutional if 
applied to the general public.  Consider the public outcries if a police presence was 
installed in a public, residential neighborhood seven days a week, residents were required 
to carry identification that had to be presented on demand at ID checkpoints, and 
residents could be evicted from their homes for relatively minor offenses. 
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Much of the literature regarding evaluations of police policy involves the use of 
customer satisfaction or victimization surveys.   As previously noted, available resources 
did not permit me to conduct an extensive survey of KCDC residents.   A survey would 
produce a better understanding of Sampson and Wilson’s (1998) notions of social 
disorganization and cultural social isolation.  A survey of the Security Patrol officers 
might yield insights into their understanding of the crime problems in Knoxville’s public 
housing, as well as their opinions about the residents and the policies of the Security 
Patrol, KPD as a whole, and KCDC.  Because of the problems inherent in telephone 
surveys conducted in public housing previously mentioned in Chapter III, a face-to-face 
survey would be preferable.  Of course, conducting such a project would require some 
form of external funding. 
 
Public housing in some form will probably always exist in the United States.  As a 
consequence, public housing authorities and local law enforcement agencies must 
continue to develop new ways to control crime.  Knoxville’s crime control policies 
evolved from the theories of CPTED to the aggressive law enforcement strategies 
advocated by the federal government and practiced by large cities throughout the United 
States.  Crime control in public housing may eventually take a different direction, yet 
regardless of the form of such efforts, social scientists need to continue to evaluate the 
new policies and programs for effectiveness.   
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APPENDIX B. 
Correcting Data with Arcview 
 
Arcview Address Matching 
 
The Geocoding Editor function of Arcview allowed me to review “bad addresses” 
one at a time to remove spelling errors and/or to find other addresses that were physically 
close to a bad address.   For the non-user of Arcview, this process is similar to using the 
“Find” function in Microsoft Word, where the software seeks to find possible word 
matches to user-defined parameters.  
 
The user sets options in the Geocoding Editor that forces the software to list in a 
pop-up window the possible matches for an address it doesn’t recognize.  Possible 
matches will include all streets that are spelled similarly, and all the addresses on a 
particular street that are close numerically.  The user has to decide how to select an 
address from the possible list to “match” to the unrecognizable address.  Once the user 
matches a possible address to an unrecognizable one, the software will associate the bad 
address with the one the user selects.  Consequently, it was vital that I selected the closest 
possible match address to ensure valid map results, upon which all my statistical analyses 
were based. 
 
Arcview automatically gives percent “match scores” to the addresses it lists from 
the Address theme that are close to the bad address.  One can set preferences (under 
“Geocoding Preferences”) to cause the software to return possible matches when there is 
more than one address re-match candidate; when there are multiple candidates scoring 
higher than the user-defined minimum match score; and when there is no matching 
candidate.  By setting re-match preferences (for spelling and match score) to zero, the 
software would return all close spelling matches and all possible matches, even if scoring 
a low percentage match.  Reviewing all possible addresses for matching was important, 
because many possible matches were of a very low percentage match score due to an 
omission or misspelling in a database entry. 
 
Decision Rules 
 
Occasionally when I removed an obvious spelling error, the software would return 
a 100% match, resulting in a clear decision.  If no possible match returned, I would check 
for possible spelling errors that may have prevented a match.  If there were no spelling 
errors, or an address was not recognized by the software, it was left as a “No match,” and 
that crime incident could not be included in my analysis.  
  
Typically, the software returned multiple possible address matches, from which I 
had to make a decision to assign a map location for a particular crime incident.  For 
example, a given bad address in the database may be “507 Merchants”.  The software 
would return a list of several possible matches with associated match scores, such as the 
below example: 
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Match  Address 
score 
32   507  Market St 
20   504 Merchant Dr 
20   512 Merchant Dr 
20   514 Merchant Dr 
20   501 Merchant Dr 
20    502 Merchant Dr 
 
The highest percentage match score was “507 Market,” yet this is obviously the wrong 
street.  All of the Merchant Drive addresses are likely on the correct street, because 
Arcview will only return possible matches for similarly named streets, and numerically 
close addresses on those streets.  There could conceivably be another street using the 
Merchant name (i.e. Merchant Avenue), but Arcview did not show those addresses as 
possible matches because the other street may only include locations that are in an 
entirely different numerical range (i.e., ranging from the 5000 to 8000 street blocks).   
 
For this example, 504 and 512 Merchant Drive are closest numerically; however, 
I would assume they are likely on the wrong side of the street because 507 is an odd 
number.   The 501 Merchant Drive location would be my next choice, because it is 
presumably on the correct side of the street, but it is more than 5 numbers away (my 
personal cut-off point).  So I would go with 504 Merchant Drive, because it is closest 
numerically.   
 
If there were two addresses that were equidistant from a given address, with one 
above and one below, I always went with the lower of the two for consistency.  
Preferably, if an exact match could not be found, I would first try to find the next address 
that was numerically lower than the bad address, and which was also likely to be on the 
same side of the street.  Therefore, the optimal choice for a match in the above example 
would be 505 Merchant Drive.  Unfortunately, the software seldom found a match this 
close, and I would have to make a decision.   
 
If a numerically lower address could not be found, my next preference would be 
the next numerically higher address, on the same side of the street.   After that, I would 
select the next closest numerical address, regardless of whether it was odd or even 
numbered.  If I could not find a possible match within a range of approximately ten 
address locations, I left the incident location as a “No match.”  Usually I could find an 
address within five address numbers to the bad address.  By keeping the numerical street 
addresses as close as possible when creating matches, I could with some certainty be 
confident that all of the crime incidents included in my analysis were mapped close to 
their true locations.  Table 10 contains the match scores for each year.  No Match entries 
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were included in the calculations for my descriptive statistics, because Arcview was still 
able to place pins representing them.   
 
Table 10. 
Match Scores Per Year 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Match 
score 
10465 
69% 
9244
69%
8864
67%
9110
67%
7400
69%
7607
68%
6935
68%
6704
71%
7094
75%
8029
78%
Partial 
match 
2663 
17% 
2362
18%
2483
19%
2494
18%
1811
17%
2033
18%
1872
18%
1733
18%
1325
14%
1243
12%
No match 2104 14% 
1766
13%
1910
14%
2054
15%
1529
14%
1522
14%
1355
13%
1052
11%
1040
11%
982
10%
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